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Abstract
We present three private fingerprint alignment and matching protocols, based on precise and
efficient fingerprint recognition algorithms that use minutia points. Our protocols allow two
or more semi-honest parties to compare privately-held fingerprints in a secure way such that
nothing more than an accurate score of how well the fingerprints match is revealed to output
recipients. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time fingerprint alignment based
on minutiae is considered in a secure computation framework. We build secure fingerprint
alignment and matching protocols in both the two-party setting using garbled circuits and in
the multi-party setting using secret sharing. In addition to providing precise and efficient secure
fingerprint comparisons, our contributions include the design of a number of secure sub-protocols
for complex operations such as sine/cosine, arctangent, and selection, which are likely to be of
independent interest.
1 Introduction
Computing securely with biometric data is challenging because biometric identification applications
often require accurate metrics and recognition algorithms, but the data involved is so sensitive that
if it is ever revealed or stolen the victim may be vulnerable to impersonation attacks for the rest of
their life. This risk is particularly true for fingerprints, which have been used since the 19th century
for identification purposes and are being used for such purposes ubiquitously today, including for
cellphones, laptops, digital storage devices, safes, immigration, and physical building/room access,
as well as the classic application of identifying criminals. Thus, there is a strong motivation for fast
and secure fingerprint recognition protocols that protect fingerprint data but nevertheless allow for
highly accurate scores for fingerprint comparison.
The setting we consider in this paper is one where the parties involved are honest-but-curious
(although, in some cases, malicious parties can also be tolerated using known hardening techniques).
That is, two or more parties hold private fingerprint data that they would like to compare in a fast
way that provides an accurate score for the comparison but does not reveal the actual fingerprint
data. For example, the computation could involve comparing multiple pairs of fingerprint represen-
tations stored in two privacy-sensitive databases (e.g., one owned by the FBI and the other owned
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Figure 1: A set of minutiae with orientations. The image is generated by NIST’s Fingerprint
Minutiae Viewer (FpMV) software [1] using a fingerprint from NIST’s Special Database 4 [2].
by a university), or it could involve a single comparison of a suspected criminal’s fingerprint to a
fingerprint found at a crime scene.
According to accepted best practices (e.g., see [49, 51, 57]) the most accurate fingerprint recog-
nition algorithms are based on the use of minutia points, which are fingerprint “landmarks,” such
as where two ridges merge or split. (See Figure 1.) Such geometric recognition algorithms generally
involve two main steps: alignment and matching. Alignment involves computing a geometric trans-
formation to best “line up” two sets of minutiae and matching involves scoring the similarity of two
sets of (hopefully overlapping) minutia points. Alignment is necessary for the meaningful and ac-
curate application of the matching step, yet, to the best of our knowledge, all previous publications
on secure fingerprint recognition, except for a paper by Kerschbaum et al. [40], focus exclusively
on the matching step, possibly because of the computational difficulty of finding a good alignment.
Instead, our approach is on the design of efficient protocols for the entire fingerprint recognition
process, including both the alignment and matching steps, so as to provide secure protocols for
accurate fingerprint recognition algorithms used in practice.
In this work, we focus on three algorithms that compare fingerprints using both alignment and
matching:
1. A simple geometric transformation algorithm that finds the best matching by tryng each pair
of minutiae [49].
2. An algorithm that aligns fingerprints based on high curvature points [51].
3. An algorithm based on spectral minutia representation [57].
These algorithms were selected due to their precision, speed, and/or popularity, with the goal of
building efficient and practical security solutions.
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We design secure sub-protocols for trigonometric and inverse trigonometric functions for fixed-
point values; sine and cosine protocols have structure similar to the solution in [39].
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• We design a new secure sub-protocol for selecting the fth smallest element in a set of com-
parable elements. It is based on an efficient square-root sampling algorithm.
• We build three secure and efficient protocols for fingerprint alignment and matching, using
of the above new building blocks applied to the three well-known fingerprint recognition
algorithms mentioned above.
• We implement one of the secure fingerprint recognition protocols and show its efficiency in
practice.
All constructions work in both two-party and multi-party settings and are presented in the semi-
honest model. However, a number of available techniques can be used to achieve security in the
malicious model (e.g., [30, 25, 5] and others in the multi-party secret sharing setting and [43] among
others in the two-party garbled circuits setting).
In what follows, we describe related work in Section 2. Section 3 provides necessary fingerprint
background, including the three fingerprint comparison algorithms which are the focus of this work.
Section 4 describes the problem statement, security model, and frameworks on which we rely to
realize secure fingerprint comparisons. Then Section 5 gives an overview of existing secure building
blocks used in this work and describes new secure sub-protocols not available in the prior literature
that we design to enable secure fingerprint comparisons. Our main protocols for the three selected
fingerprint alignment and matching algorithms are given in Section 6. Experimental evaluation of
our secure realization of the third spectral minutia representation algorithm in two different secure
computation frameworks is given in Section 7. Lastly, Section 8 concludes this work.
2 Related Work
Work on secure two- and multi-party computation is extensive and such protocols have been shown
to be effective for privacy-preserving evaluation of various functions (e.g., see [27, 20, 48, 26]).
Following the seminal work of Yao [58], it is generally known today that any computable function
can be securely evaluated, albeit with varying degrees of practicality. For instance, there are a
variety of general approaches that typically represent the function to be evaluated as a Boolean or
arithmetic circuit (e.g., see [20, 48, 26]). To date, such general approaches have typically been the
most efficient in practice. Thus, there are also a wide variety of custom function-specific protocols
that target the design of more efficient secure solutions than what the generic approaches provide,
including protocols for biometric identification for different modalities, such as iris, face, etc. (see.,
e.g., [28, 16] among others). Because each biometric modality has a unique representation and
drastically different algorithms for their comparisons, techniques for other biometric modalities are
out of scope of this work.
The first work to treat secure fingerprint comparisons is due to Barni et al. [8]. The method
uses the FingerCode representation of fingerprints (which uses texture information from a finger-
print) and utilizes a homomorphic encryption scheme. FingerCode-based fingerprint comparisons
can be implemented efficiently using Euclidean distance; hence, the solution of [8] is relatively
fast. Unfortunately, FingerCode-based comparisons are not as discriminative as other fingerprint
recognition algorithms (in particular, minutia-based algorithms) and is not considered sufficient for
fingerprint-based identification suitable for criminal trials.
Huang et al. [36] propose a privacy-preserving protocol for biometric identification using fin-
gerprint matching which uses homomorphic encryption and garbled circuit (GC) evaluation. The
construction utilizes FingerCodes and the work provides some optimizations, such as using off-line
3
execution and smaller circuits, which make the solution more efficient than prior work. Neverthe-
less, the solution still suffers from the lack of accuracy derived from being based on FingerCodes.
Blanton and Gasti [16, 17] also improve the performance of secure fingerprint comparisons
based on FingerCodes and additionally provide the first privacy-preserving solution for minutia-
based fingerprint matching. The solutions use a combination of homomorphic encryption and GC
evaluation, and assume that fingerprints are independently pre-aligned. That is, the work treats
the matching step only, not the more difficult alignment step. To compare two fingerprints, T and
S, consisting of pre-aligned sets of m and n minutia points, respectively, their algorithm considers
each point ti of T in turn, determines the list of points in S within a certain distance and orientation
from si that have not yet been paired up with another point in T . If this list is not empty, ti is
paired up with the closest point on its list. The total number of paired up points is the size of
matching, which can consequently be compared to a threshold to determine whether the fingerprints
are related or not. Although their method is lacking in the alignment step, we use similar logic for
computing matching between two transformed fingerprints in our protocols.
Shahandashti et al. [54] also propose a privacy-preserving protocol for minutia-based fingerprint
matching, which uses homomorphic encryption and is based on evaluation of polynomials in en-
crypted form. However, the complexity of their protocol is substantially higher than that of [17]
and their method can also introduce an error when a minutia point from one fingerprint has more
than one minutia point from the other fingerprint within a close distance and orientation from it.
More recently, Blanton and Saraph [18] introduce a privacy-preserving solution for minutia-
based fingerprint matching that formulates the problem as determining the size of the maximum
flow in a bipartite graph and provides a data-oblivious algorithm for it. The algorithm is guaranteed
to pair the minutiae from S with the minutiae from T in such a way that the size of the pairing is
maximal (which previous solutions could not achieve). The algorithm can be used in both two-party
and multi-party settings, but only the two-party protocol based on GC evaluation was implemented.
Lastly, Kerschbaum et al. [40] propose a private fingerprint verification protocol between two
parties that includes both alignment and matching steps. Unfortunately, the solution leaks infor-
mation about fingerprint images used and uses a simplified alignment and matching computation
that is not as robust to fingerprint variations as other algorithms.
3 Fingerprint Background
A fingerprint represents an exterior surface of a finger. All features extracted from a fingerprint
image allow one to uniquely identify the individual who owns the fingerprint. One of the features
most commonly used for fingerprint recognition is minutiae, which are represented as a set of points
in the two-dimensional plane with an angle orientation. Minutiae points generally correspond to
fingerprint ridge endings or branches, and are typically represented by the following elements [49]:
1) an x-coordinate, 2) a y-coordinate, 3) an orientation, θ, that corresponds to the angle between
the minutiae ridge and the horizontal line measured in degrees, and 4) an optional minutia type.
Some algorithms might store additional information in the fingerprint representation, e.g., the
relationship of each minutia point to a reference point such as the core point representing the
center of a fingerprint.
All of the algorithms that we describe are based on minutia points. One of them, however, uses
an alternative representation in the form of a spectrum of a fixed size. Thus, the minutiae might be
not represented as points, but instead use a spectral representation as detailed later. Furthermore,
one of the fingerprint recognition algorithms upon which we build relies on an additional type of
fingerprint features, which are high curvature points extracted from a fingerprint image. Then in
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Algorithm 1: Fingerprint recognition based on geometrical transformation
Input: Two fingerprints T = {ti = (xi, yi, θi)}mi=1 and S = {si = (x′i, y′i, θ′i)}ni=1, and thresholds λ
and λθ.
Output: The largest number of matching minutiae, Cmax, and the corresponding alignment.
1. Initialize Cmax = 0.
2. For i = 1, . . .,m and j = 1, . . ., n, use (ti, sj) as a reference pair and perform:
(a) Compute transformation ∆x = x′j − xi, ∆y = y′j − yi, and ∆θ = θ′j − θi.
(b) Transfer each minutia sk ∈ S as x′′k = cos(∆θ) · x′k+ sin(∆θ) · y′k −∆x,
y′′k = − sin(∆θ) · x′k + cos(∆θ)· y′k −∆y, and θ′′k = θ′k −∆θ and save the result as
S′′ = {s′′i = (x′′i , y′′i , θ′′i )}ni=1.
(c) Compute the number C of matched minutiae between T and S′′ using Algorithm 2 and
parameters λ and λθ.
(d) If Cmax < C, then set Cmax = C and (∆xmax,∆ymax,∆θmax) = (∆x,∆y,∆θ).
3. Return Cmax and its corresponding alignment (∆xmax,∆ymax,∆θmax).
addition to storing minutia points, each fingerprint contains a set of high curvature points, each of
which is represented as (x, y, w). Here, first two elements indicate the location of the point and the
last element is its curvature value in the range 0–2 (see [51] for the details of its computation).
In the remainder of this section, we describe the three selected fingerprint recognition algorithms
without security considerations. All of them take two fingerprints T and S as their input, align them,
and output the number of matching minutiae between the aligned fingerprints. In all algorithms,
a fingerprint contains a set of minutiae, (t1, . . ., tm) for T and (s1, . . ., sn) for S, or an alternative
representation derived from the minutiae. Additionally, the second algorithm uses a number of high
curvature points stored in a fingerprint, and we denote them by (tˆ1, . . ., tˆmˆ) for T and (sˆ1, . . ., sˆnˆ)
for S.
3.1 Fingerprint Recognition using Brute Force Search
The first algorithm searches for the best alignment between T and S by considering that minutia
ti ∈ T corresponds to minutia sj ∈ S for all possible pairs (ti, sj) (called a reference pair) [49]. Once
a new reference pair is chosen, the algorithm transforms the minutiae from S using a geometrical
transformation and also rotates them, after which it counts the number of matched minutiae.
After trying all possible reference pairs, the algorithm chooses an alignment that maximizes the
number of matched minutiae and thus increases the likelihood of the two fingerprints to be matched.
Algorithm 1 lists the details of this approach. The parameters λ and λθ are used by the matching
step as detailed below.
To implement the matching step, we use an algorithm that iterates through all points in ti ∈ T
and pairs ti with a minutia sj ∈ S (if any) within a close spatial and directional distance from
ti. When multiple points satisfy the matching criteria, the closest to ti is chosen, as described in
[49, 17]. This computation of the matching step is given in Algorithm 2.
The time complexity of Algorithm 2 is O(nm), and the time complexity of Algorithm 1 is
O(n2m2) when Algorithm 2 is used as its subroutine.
3.2 Fingerprint Recognition using High Curvature Points for Alignment
The second fingerprint recognition algorithm [51] uses fingerprints’ high curvature information to
align them. The alignment is based on the iterative closest point (ICP) algorithm [12] that estimates
the rigid transformation F between T and S. Once this transformation is determined, it is applied
to the minutia points of S, after which the algorithm computes the number of matched minutiae
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Algorithm 2: Fingerprint matching
Input: Two fingerprints T = {ti = (xi, yi, θi)}mi=1, S = {si = (x′i, y′i, θ′i)}ni=1 and thresholds λ and λθ
for distance and orientation.
Output: The number C of matched minutiae between T and S.
1. Set C = 0.
2. Mark each sj ∈ S as available.
3. For i = 1, . . .,m, do:
(a) Create a list Li consisting of all available points sj ∈ S that satisfy min(|θi − θ′j |,
360− |θi − θ′j |) < λθ and
√
(xi − x′j)2 + (yi − y′j)2 < λ.
(b) If Li is not empty, select the closest minutia sk to ti from Li, mark sk as unavailable and set
C = C + 1.
4. return C.
between T and transformed S. The ICP algorithm assumes that the fingerprints are roughly pre-
aligned, which can be done, e.g., by aligning each fingerprint independently using its core point,
and iteratively finds point correspondences and the transformation between them. To eliminate
alignment errors when the overlap between the two sets is partial, [51] suggests using the trimmed
ICP (TICP) algorithm [24]. The TICP algorithm ignores a proportion of the points in T whose
distances to the corresponding points in S are large, which makes it robust to outliers.
The details of this fingerprint recognition approach are given in Algorithm 3. Steps 1–10
correspond to the TICP algorithm that proceeds with iterations, aligning the fingerprints closer
to each other in each successive iteration. The termination parameters δ and γ correspond to the
threshold for the total distance between the matched points of T and S and the limit on the number
of iterations, respectively. For robustness, the alignment is performed using only a subset of the
points (f closest pairs computed in step 4). The optimal motion for transforming one set of the
points into the other (treated as two 3-D shapes) is computed using the union quaternion method
due to Horn [35], and is given in Algorithm 4. The transformation is represented as a 3× 3 matrix
R and a vector v of size 3, which are consequently used to align the points in S (step 8).
Once the fingerprints are sufficiently aligned, the overall transformation between the original
and aligned S is computed (step 11). It is then applied to the minutia points of S: The new x
and y coordinates of the minutiae can be computed directly using the transformation (R, v), while
orientation θ requires special handling (since it is not used in computing the optimal motion). We
compute the difference in the orientation between the original and aligned S as the angle between
the slopes of two lines drawn using two points from the original and transformed S, respectively
(step 12).
The original ICP algorithm [12] lists expected and worst case complexities of computing the
closest points (step 3 of Algorithm 3) to be O(mˆ log nˆ) and O(mˆnˆ), respectively. The approach,
however, becomes prone to errors in the presence of outliers, and thus in the TICP solution [24] a
bounding box is additionally used to eliminate errors. In step 4, we can use fth smallest element
selection to find the smallest distances, which runs in linear time (the TICP paper suggests sorting,
but sorting results in higher asymptotic complexities). The complexity of Algorithm 4 is O(k) when
run on k input pairs. Thus, the overall complexity of Algorithm 3 (including Algorithms 4 and 2)
is O(γmˆnˆ+mn), where γ is the upper bound on the number of iterations in the algorithm.
3.3 Fingerprint Recognition based on Spectral Minutiae Representation
The last fingerprint recognition algorithm [57] uses minutia-based representation of fingerprints,
but offers greater efficiency than other algorithms because of an alternative form of minutia rep-
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Algorithm 3: Fingerprint recognition based on high curvature points for alignment
Input: Two fingerprints consisting of minutiae and high curvature points T = ({ti = (xi, yi, θi)}mi=1,
{tˆi = (xˆi, yˆi, wˆi)}mˆi=1) and S = ({si = (x′i, y′i, θ′i)}ni=1, {sˆi = (xˆ′i, yˆ′i, wˆ′i)}nˆi=1); matching thresholds λ
and λθ; scaling parameter β; minimum number of matched high curvature points f ; algorithm
termination parameters δ and γ.
Output: The largest number of matching minutiae, C, and the corresponding alignment.
1. Set SLTS = 0.
2. Store a copy of sˆi’s as s¯i = (x¯i, y¯i, w¯i) for i = 1, . . . , nˆ.
3. For i = 1, . . ., nˆ, find the closest to sˆi point tˆj in T and store their distance di. Here, the distance
between any sˆi and tˆj is defined as
√
(xˆ′i − xˆj)2 + (yˆ′i − yˆj)2 + β|wˆ′i − wˆj |.
4. Find f smallest di’s and calculate their sum S
′
LTS .
5. If S′LTS ≤ δ or γ = 0, proceed with step 11.
6. Set SLTS = S
′
LTS .
7. Compute the optimal motion (R, v) for the selected f pairs using Algorithm 4.
8. For i = 1, . . . , nˆ, transform point sˆi according to (R, v) as sˆi = Rsˆi + v.
9. Set γ = γ − 1.
10. Repeat from step 3.
11. Compute the optimal motion (R, v) for nˆ pairs (s¯i, sˆi) using Algorithm 4. Let ri,j denote R’s cell at
row i and column j and vi denote the ith element of v.
12. Compute c1 = (y¯2 − y¯1)/(x¯2 − x¯1), c2 = (yˆ′2 − yˆ′1)(xˆ′2 − xˆ′1), and ∆θ = arctan((c1 − c2)/(1 + c1c2)).
13. For i = 1, . . ., n, apply the transformation to minutia si by computing x
′
i = r1,1x
′
i + r1,2y
′
i + v1,
y′i = r2,1x
′
i + r2,2y
′
i + v2, and θ
′
i = θ
′
i −∆θ.
14. Compute the number, C, of matched minutiae between ti’s and transformed si’s (e.g., using
Algorithm 2).
15. Return C and the transformation (R, v).
resentation. The spectral minutia representation [56] that it uses is a fixed-length feature vector,
in which rotation and scaling can be easily compensated for, resulting in efficient alignment of two
fingerprints.
In the original spectral minutia representation [56], a set of minutiae corresponds to a real-
valued vector of a fixed length D, which is written in the form of a matrix of dimensions M ×N
(= D). The vector is normalized to have zero mean and unit energy. Thus, we now represent T
and S as matrices of dimensions M × N and denote their individual elements as ti,j ’s and si,j ’s,
respectively.
To compare two fingerprints in the spectral representation, two-dimensional correlation is used
as a measure of their similarity. Furthermore, to compensate for fingerprint image rotations, which
in this representation become circular shifts in the horizontal direction, the algorithm tries a number
of rotations in both directions and computes the highest score among all shifts. This alignment
and matching algorithm is presented as Algorithm 5. It is optimized to perform shifts from −15 to
15 units (which correspond to rotations from −10◦ to +10◦) and computes only 9 similarity scores
instead of all 31 of them. Later in this section, we show how the algorithm can be generalized to
work with any amount of shift λ resulting in only O(log λ) score computations.
Xu et al. [57] apply feature reduction to the spectral minutia representation to reduce the
size of the feature vector and consequently improve the time of fingerprint comparisons without
losing precision. That work describes two types of feature reduction: Column Principle Component
Analysis (CPCA) and Line Discrete Fourier Transform (LDFT). Then one or both of them can be
applied to the feature vector, with the latter option providing the greatest savings.
The first form of feature reduction, CPCA, reduces the minutia spectrum feature in the vertical
direction. After the transformation, the signal is concentrated in the top rows and the remaining
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Algorithm 4: Union quaternion method for computing optimal motion
Input: n pairs {(ti = (xi, yi, zi), si = (x′i, y′i, z′i))}ni=1.
Output: Optimal motion (R, v).
1. For i = 1, . . . , n, compute unit quaternion qi = (q(i,1), q(i,2), q(i,3), q(i,4)) =
(√
1+ki
2 , ui
√
1−ki
2
)
, where
ki =
xi·x′i+yi·y′i+zi·z′i√
x2i+y
2
i+z
2
i ·
√
x′2i +y
′2
i +z
′2
i
, ui =
(
yi·z′i−zi·y′i
||ti×si|| ,
zix
′
i−xiz′i
||ti×si|| ,
xi·y′i−yi·x′i
||ti×si||
)
, and
||ti × si|| =
√
(yi · z′i − zi · y′i)2 + (zi · x′i − xi · z′i)2 + (xi · y′i − yi · x′i)2.
2. Compute the overall unit quaternions q = [q1, q2, q3, q4] = q1q2 . . . qn−1qn by executing multiplication
from left to right, where qjqj+1 = [q(j,1)q(j+1,1) − vj · vj+1, q(j,1)vj+1 + q(j+1,1)vj + vj × vj+1],
vj = (q(j,2), q(j,3), q(j,4)), and vj+1 = (q(j+1,2), q(j+1,3), q(j+1,4)) for j = 1, . . . , n− 1.
3. Compute rotation matrix R =
 q21 + q22 − q23 − q24 2(q2q3 − q1q4) 2(q2q4 + q1q3)2(q3q2 + q1q4) q21 − q22 + q23 − q24 2(q3q4 − q1q2)
2(q4q2 − q1q3) 2(q4q3 − q1q2) q21 − q22 − q23 + q24
.
4. Compute transformation vector v = t−Rs, where t = (∑ni=1 ti)/n and s = (∑ni=1 si)/n.
5. Return (R, v).
Algorithm 5: Fingerprint recognition based on spectral minutia representation
Input: Two real-valued matrices T = {ti,j}M,Ni=1,j=1 and S = {si,j}M,Ni=1,j=1 and parameter λ = 15
indicating the maximum amount of rotation.
Output: The best matching score Cmax and the corresponding alignment.
1. Set Cmax = 0.
2. For α = −12,−6, 0, 6, 12, do:
(a) Compute the similarity score between T and S horizontally shifted by α positions as
Cα =
1
MN
∑M
i=1
∑N
j=1 ti,j · si,(j+α) mod N .
(b) If Cα > Cmax, set Cmax = C, k = α, and αmax = α.
3. For α = k − 2, k + 2, do:
(a) Compute the similarity score between T and S shifted by α positions as in step 2(a).
(b) If C > Cmax, set Cmax = C, k
′ = α, and αmax = α.
4. For α = k′ − 1, k′ + 1, do:
(a) Compute the similarity score between T and S shifted by α positions as in step 2(a).
(b) If C > Cmax, set Cmax = C and αmax = α.
5. Return Cmax and αmax.
rows that carry little or no energy are removed. As a result, a minutia spectrum is represented as
a matrix of dimension M ′ ×N for some M ′ < M . Because the rotation operation commutes with
this transformation, the score computation in Algorithm 5 remain unchanged after CPCA feature
reduction.
The second form of feature reduction, LDFT, reduces the minutia spectrum in the horizontal
direction and returns a feature matrix of dimension M ×N ′ (or M ′×N ′ if applied after the CPCA
feature reduction) for some N ′ < N . The matrix consists of complex numbers as a result of applying
Fourier transform. After the LDFT, the energy is concentrated in the middle columns and other
columns are consequently removed. Shifting matrix S in the resulting representation by α positions
now translates into setting its cell at location k, j to e−i
2pi
N
jα · sk,j , where i indicates the imaginary
part of a complex number. Note that circular shifts are no longer applied to matrix rows (including
when the LDFT is applied after the CPCA feature reduction).
The resulting matrices of complex numbers T and S are then converted to real-valued matrices
and processed using Algorithm 5. If we express a cell of T or S at location k, j as ak,j + ibk,j
by separating its real and imaginary parts, then the kth row of T and S is now expressed as a
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real-valued vector √
1
N
ak,1,
√
2
N
ak,2, . . . ,
√
2
N
ak,N ,
√
2
N
bk,2, . . . ,
√
2
N
bk,N ′ .
Computing the score between T and S then corresponds to computing the dot product of each kth
row of T and S and adding the values across all k. When we use Algorithm 5 to compute the best
similarity score, we need to adjust the computation in step 2(a) for the new matrix dimensions and
also implement rotation as a multiplication instead of a shift. If we expand the quantity e−i
2pi
N
jα
using the formula eiϕ = cos(ϕ) + i sin(ϕ), the real part of each score between T and S rotated by
α positions now becomes:
Cα =
1
MN2
M ′∑
k=1
(
ak,1
(
a′k,1 cos
(
−2piα
N
)
− b′k,1 sin
(
−2piα
N
))
+ (1)
+ 2
N ′∑
j=2
(
cos
(
−2pijα
N
)(
ak,ja
′
k,j + bk,jb
′
k,j
)
+ sin
(
−2pijα
N
)(
a′k,jbk,j − ak,jb′k,j
))
where tk,j = ak,j + ibk,j and original sk,j = a
′
k,j + ib
′
k,j .
Returning to Algorithm 5, we generalize the algorithm to work for any value of λ so that only
O(log λ) score computations are necessary. Let λ = c · 3k for some constants c ≥ 2 and k ≥ 1. Our
algorithm proceeds in k+ 1 iterations computing c scores in the first iteration and 2 scores in each
consecutive iteration, which results in the total of c+2k score computations. In the initial iteration
0, we compute c scores at indices λ = d3k/2e, . . ., d3k(2c − 1)/2e, then determine their maximum
Cmax and the index of the maximum score αmax. In iteration i = 1, . . ., k, the algorithm computes
two scores at indices αmax± 3k−i, determines the maximum of the computed scores and Cmax, and
updates the value of αmax as needed. Compared to Algorithm 5, this approach covers 54 shifts
using 8 score computations instead of 9 score computations for 31 shifts. The best performance is
achieved when λ = 2 · 3k for some k. If λ is not of that form, we could use a different value of c,
cover a wider range of shifts than required, or decrease the step size of the algorithm by less than
a factor of 3 (as was done in Algorithm 5), which results in redundant coverage.
In [57], parameters M ′ and N ′ are chosen to retain most of the signal’s energy after the trans-
formations (e.g., 90%) and may be dependent on the data set. The complexity of Algorithm 5 for
two fingerprints after both types of feature reduction is O(M ′N ′ log λ).
4 Security Model
4.1 Problem Statement and Security Definitions
Because of the variety of settings in which fingerprint recognition may be used, we distinguish
between different computation setups and the corresponding security settings.
1. There will be circumstances when two entities would like to compare fingerprints that they
respectively possess without revealing any information about their data to each other. This
can correspond to the cases when both entities own a fingerprint database and would like
to find entries common to both of them or when one entity would like to search a database
belonging to a different entity for a specific fingerprint. In these settings, the computation
takes the form of secure two-party computation and the participants can be regarded as
semi-honest or malicious depending on the application and their trust level.
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2. There will also be circumstances when one or more data owners are computationally limited
and would like to securely offload their work to more powerful servers or cloud providers (this
applies even if all fingerprints used in the computation belong to a single entity). Then multi-
party settings that allow for input providers to be different from the computational parties
apply. In such settings, the computational parties are typically treated as semi-honest, but
stronger security models can also be used for added security guarantees.
Regardless of the setup, the same strong data privacy guarantees must hold: A data owner possesses
one or more fingerprints after feature extraction (e.g., a fingerprint is represented as a set of minutia
or high curvature points as discussed above). The size of each fingerprint representation (i.e., the
number of elements stored in it) is public, but the values themselves are private. For example, a set
of minutia points is used in secure computation as 〈([x1], [y1], [θ1]), . . . , ([xm], [ym], [θm])〉, where
[x] denotes that the value of x is private and always protected. Then no information that depends
on private values can be revealed during the computation and the only information that can be
available to the parties running secure computation is public parameters and data sizes. Once the
computation is complete, the output can be revealed to one or more parties based on their prior
agreement.
For example, in the algorithm in section 3.1, the private inputs are two sets of minutiae points
T and S of public sizes m and n, respectively, fixed thresholds λ and λθ are public inputs, and the
private output is [Cmax] and the corresponding alignment. Similarly, in fingerprint recognition in
section 3.2, the private input are two sets of minutiae and high curvature points T and S, while their
sizes m, mˆ, n, nˆ and other fixed parameters (such as f , γ, etc.) are public; and so forth. In each
protocol that we describe in this work, private inputs are explicitly marked, and any information
derived from them must remain properly protected (i.e., no information leakage is tolerated), as
formalized in our security definition below.
Security of any multi-party protocol (with two or more participants) can be formally shown
according to one of the two standard security definitions. The first, weaker security model assumes
that the participants are semi-honest, defined as they follow the computation as prescribed, but
might attempt to learn additional information about the data from the intermediate results. The
second, stronger security model allows dishonest participants to arbitrarily deviate from the pre-
scribed computation. The focus of this work is on the semi-honest adversarial model, although
standard techniques for strengthening security in the presence of fully malicious participants can
be used as well. Security in the semi-honest setting is defined as follows.
Definition 1 Let parties P1, . . ., Pn engage in a protocol Π that computes function f(in1, . . ., inn) =
(out1, . . ., outn), where ini and outi denote the input and output of party Pi, respectively. Let
VIEWΠ(Pi) denote the view of participant Pi during the execution of protocol Π. More pre-
cisely, Pi’s view is formed by its input and internal random coin tosses ri, as well as messages
m1, . . .,mk passed between the parties during protocol execution: VIEWΠ(Pi) = (ini, ri,m1, . . .,mk).
Let I = {Pi1 , Pi2 , . . ., Piτ } denote a subset of the participants for τ < n and VIEWΠ(I) denote
the combined view of participants in I during the execution of protocol Π (i.e., VIEWΠ(I) =
(VIEWΠ(Pi1), . . .,VIEWΠ(Piτ ))) and fI(in1, . . ., inn) denote the projection of f(in1, . . ., inn) on the
coordinates in I (i.e., fI(in1, . . ., inn) consists of the i1th, . . . , iτ th element that f(in1, . . ., inn)
outputs). We say that protocol Π is τ -private in the presence of semi-honest adversaries if for
each coalition of size at most τ there exists a probabilistic polynomial time simulator SI such that
{SI(inI , fI(in1, . . ., inn)), f(in1, . . ., inn)} ≡ {VIEWΠ(I), (out1, . . ., outn)}, where inI =
⋃
Pi∈I{ini}
and ≡ denotes computational or statistical indistinguishability.
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4.2 Secure Function Evaluation Frameworks
To realize our constructions in a variety of settings, two secure computation frameworks are of
interest to us. In the two-party setting, we build on garbled circuit (GC) evaluation techniques,
while in the multi-party setting, we employ linear secret sharing (SS) techniques. These frameworks
are briefly described below.
Garbled circuit evaluation. The use of GCs allows two parties P1 and P2 to securely evaluate
a Boolean circuit of their choice. That is, given an arbitrary function f(x1, x2) that depends on
private inputs x1 and x2 of P1 and P2, respectively, the parties first represent is as a Boolean circuit.
One party, say P1, acts as a circuit generator and creates a garbled representation of the circuit
by associating both values of each binary wire with random labels. The other party, say P2, acts
as a circuit evaluator and evaluates the circuit in its garbled representation without knowing the
meaning of the labels that it handles during the evaluation. The output labels can be mapped to
their meaning and revealed to either or both parties.
An important component of GC evaluation is 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer (OT). It allows
the circuit evaluator to obtain wire labels corresponding to its inputs. In particular, in OT the
sender (i.e., circuit generator in our case) possesses two strings s0 and s1 and the receiver (circuit
evaluator) has a bit σ. OT allows the receiver to obtain string sσ and the sender learns nothing.
An OT extension allows any number of OTs to be realized with small additional overhead per OT
after a constant number of regular more costly OT protocols (the number of which depends on the
security parameter). The literature contains many realizations of OT and its extensions, including
very recent proposals such as [52, 37, 6] and others.
The fastest currently available approach for GC generation and evaluation we are aware of is
by Bellare et al. [11]. It is compatible with earlier optimizations, most notably the “free XOR”
gate technique [42] that allows XOR gates to be processed without cryptographic operations or
communication, resulting in lower overhead for such gates. A recent half-gates optimization [59]
can also be applied to this construction to reduce communicationassociated with garbled gates.
Secret sharing. SS techniques allow for private values to be split into random shares, which are
distributed among a number of parties, and perform computation directly on secret shared values
without computationally expensive cryptographic operations. Of a particular interest to us are
linear threshold SS schemes. With a (n, τ)-secret sharing scheme, any private value is secret-shared
among n parties such that any τ + 1 shares can be used to reconstruct the secret, while τ or fewer
parties cannot learn any information about the shared value, i.e., it is perfectly protected in the
information-theoretic sense. In a linear SS scheme, a linear combination of secret-shared values can
be performed by each party locally, without any interaction, but multiplication of secret-shared
values requires communication between all of them.
In this setting, we can distinguish between the input owner who provide input data into the
computation (by producing secret shares), computational parties who conduct the computation on
secret-shared values, and output recipients who learn the output upon computation termination
(by reconstructing it from shares). These groups can be arbitrarily overlapping and be composed
of any number of parties as long as there are at least 3 computational parties.
In the rest of this work, we assume that Shamir SS [55] is used with τ < n/2 in the semi-honest
setting for any n ≥ 3.
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5 Secure Building Blocks
To be able to build secure protocols for different fingerprint recognition algorithms, we will need to
rely on secure algorithms for performing a number of arithmetic operations, which we discuss in this
section. Most of the computation is performed on real numbers, while for some of its components
integer arithmetic will suffice (e.g., Algorithm 2 can be executed on integers when its inputs are
integer values). Complex numbers are represented as a pair (a real part and an imaginary part) of
an appropriate data type.
For the purposes of this work, we choose to use fixed-point representation for real numbers.
Operations on fixed-point numbers are generally faster than operations using floating-point repre-
sentation (see, e.g., [4]), and fixed-point representation provides sufficient precision for this appli-
cation. When it is relevant to the discussion, we assume that integers are represented using ` bits
and fixed-point values are represented using the total of ` bits, k of which are stored after the radix
point (and thus `− k are used for the integer part).
In the two-party setting based on GCs, complexity of an operation is measured in the number of
all and non-XOR Boolean gates. In the multi-party setting based on SS, we count the total number
of interactive operations as well as the number of sequential interactive operations (rounds).
In what follows, we start by listing building blocks from prior literature that we utilize in our
solutions (Section 5.1) and then proceed with presenting our design for a number of new building
blocks for which we did not find secure realizations in the literature (Section 5.2).
5.1 Known Building Blocks
Some of the operations used in the computation are elementary and are well-studied in the security
literature (e.g., [22, 23, 14, 15]), while others are more complex, but still have presence in prior
work (e.g., [14, 23, 13, 7]).
• Addition [c] ← [a] + [b] and subtraction [c] ← [a] − [b] are considered free (non-interactive)
using SS using both fixed-point and integer representations [23]. Their cost is ` non-free gates
for `-bit a and b [41] using GCs for both integer and fixed-point representations.
• Multiplication [c] ← [a] · [b] of integers involves 1 interactive operation (in 1 round) using
SS. For fixed-point numbers, truncation of k bits is additionally needed, resulting in 2k + 2
interactive operations in 4 rounds (which reduces to 2 rounds after pre-computation) [23].
Using GCs, multiplication of `-bit values (both integer and fixed-point) involves 2`2 − ` non-
free gates using the traditional algorithm [41]. This can be reduced using the Karatsuba’s
method [38], which results in fewer gates when ` > 19 [34]. Note that truncation has no cost
in Boolean circuits.
• Comparison [c] ← LT([a], [b]) that tests for a < b (and other variants) and outputs a bit
involves 4` − 2 interactive operations in 4 rounds (which reduces to 3 rounds after pre-
computation) using SS [22] (alternatively, 3` − 2 interactive operations in 6 rounds). This
operation costs ` non-free gates using GCs [41]. Both implementations work with integer and
fixed-point values of length `.
• Equality testing [c] ← EQ([a], [b]) similarly produces a bit and costs ` + 4 log ` interactive
operations in 4 rounds using SS [22]. GC-based implementation requires ` non-free gates [42].
The implementations work with both integer and fixed-point representations.
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• Division [c] ← Div([a], [b]) is available in the literature based on different underlying algo-
rithms and we are interested in the fixed-point version. A fixed-point division based on SS is
available from [23] which uses Goldschmidt’s method. The algorithm proceeds in ξ iterations,
where ξ = dlog2( `3.5)e. The same underlying algorithm could be used to implement division
using GCs, but we choose to use the readily available solution from [14] that uses the stan-
dard (shift and subtraction) division algorithm. The complexities of these implementations
are given in Table 1 .
• Integer to fixed-point conversion [b] ← Int2FP([a]) converts an integer to the fixed-point
representation by appending a number of zeros after the radix point. It involves no interactive
operations using SS and no gates using GCs.
• Fixed-point to integer conversion [b] ← FP2Int([a]) truncates all bits after the radix point of
its input. It involves no gates using GCs and costs 2k + 1 interactive operations in 3 rounds
to truncate k bits using SS [23].
• Conditional statements with private conditions of the form “if [priv] then [a] = [b]; else
[a] = [c];” are transformed into statements [a] = ([priv] ∧ [b]) ∨ (¬[priv] ∧ [c]), where b or c
may also be the original value of a (when only a single branch is present). Our optimized
implementation of this statement using GCs computes [a] = ([priv]∧ ([b]⊕ [c]))⊕ [c] with the
number of non-XOR gates equal to the bitlength of variables b and c. Using SS, we implement
the statement as [a] = [priv] · ([b]− [c]) + [c] using a single interactive operation.
• Maximum or minimum of a set 〈[amax], [imax]〉 ← Max ([a1], . . . , [am]) or 〈[amin], [imin]〉 ←
Min([a1], . . . , [am]), respectively, is defined to return the maximum/minimum element together
with its index in the set. The operation costs 2`(m − 1) + m + 1 non-free gates using GCs,
where ` is the bitlength of the elements ai [41]. Using SS, the cost is dominated by the
comparison operations, giving us 4`(m − 1) interactive operations. Instead of performing
comparisons sequentially, they can be organized into a binary tree with dlogme levels of
comparisons. Then in the first iteration, m/2 comparisons are performed, m/4 comparisons
in the second iteration, etc., with a single comparison in the last iteration. This allows the
number of rounds to grow logarithmically with m and give us 4dlogme+ 1 rounds.
When each record of the set contains multiple fields (i.e., values other than those being
compared), the cost of the operation increases by m− 1 non-free gates for each additional bit
of the record using GCs and by m− 1 interactive operations for each additional field element
of the record without increasing the number of rounds.
• Prefix multiplication 〈[b1], . . ., [bm]〉 ← PreMul ([a1], . . ., [am]) simultaneously computes [bi] =∏i
j=1[aj ] for i = 1, . . . ,m. We also use an abbreviated notation 〈[b1], . . ., [bm]〉 ← PreMul(
[a],m) when all ai’s are equal. In the SS setting, this operation saves the number of rounds
(with GCs, the number of rounds is not the main concern and multiple multiplications can be
used instead of this operation). The most efficient constant-round implementation of PreMul
for integers is available from [22] that takes only 2 rounds and 3m− 1 interactive operations.
The solution, however, is limited to non-zero integers. For fixed-point values, we use the
structure of the solution for arbitrary prefix operations from [22] which in this case results in
invoking 0.5m logm fixed-point multiplications in logm iterations of 0.5m operations each.
This gives us the total of 0.5m logm(2k + 2) interactive operations executed in 2 logm + 2
rounds. In the special case when all ais are equal, we can optimize this solution to save
many multiplications and execute only m − 1 fixed-point multiplications. This results in
(m− 1)(2k + 2) interactive operations in 2 logm+ 2 rounds.
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• Compaction 〈[b1], . . ., [bm]〉 ← Comp([a1], . . ., [am]) pushes all non-zero elements of its input to
appear before any zero element of the set. We are interested in order-preserving compaction
that also preserves the order of the non-zero elements in the input set. A solution from [18]
(based on data-oblivious order-preserving compaction in [31]) can work in both GCs and
SS settings using any type of input data. In this paper we are interested in the variant of
compaction that takes a set of tuples 〈a′i, a′′i 〉 as its input, where each a′i is a bit that indicates
whether the data item a′′i is zero or not (i.e., comparison of each data item to 0 is not needed).
The complexities of this variant are given in Table 1 .
• Array access at a private index allows to read or write an array element at a private lo-
cation. In this work we utilize only read accesses and denote the operation as a lookup
[b] ← Lookup(〈[a1], . . ., [am]〉, [ind]). The array elements ai might be protected or publically
known, but the index is always private. Typical straightforward implementations of this op-
erations include a multiplexer (as in, e.g., [60]) or comparing the index [ind] to all positions
of the array and obliviously choosing one of them. Both implementations have complexity
O(m logm) and work with GCs and SS techniques and data of different types. Based on
our analysis and performance of components of this functionality, a multiplexer-based imple-
mentation outperforms the comparison-based implementation for GCs, while the opposite is
true for SS-based techniques. We thus report performance of the best option for SS and GC
settings in Table 1 .
Each record ai can be large, in which case the complexity of the operation additionally linearly
grows with the size of array elements (or the number of field elements that each array stores
in the SS setting).
• Oblivious sorting 〈[b1], . . . , [bm]〉 ← Sort([a1], . . . , [am]) obliviously sorts an m-element set.
While several algorithms of complexity O(m logm) are known, in practice the most efficient
oblivious sorting is often the Batcher’s merge sort [9]. According to [15], the algorithm
involves 14m(log
2m− logm+4) compare-and-exchange operations that compare two elements
and conditionally swap them.
The complexities of all building blocks are listed in Table 1 , and notation is explained with each
respective protocol. All functions with the exception of Int2FP and FP2Int the associated integer and
fixed-point variants, performance of which might differ in the SS sharing. Because most protocols
exhibit the same performance for integer and fixed-point variants, for the functions with different
performance, we list both variants (integer followed by fixed-point) separated by “:”.
5.2 New Building Blocks
To build secure fingerprint recognition algorithms, we also need a number of secure building blocks
for rather complex operations that previously have not been sufficiently treated in the literature.
Thus, in this section, we present secure constructions for a number of operations, including trigono-
metric operations, and selection of the fth smallest element of a set.
We explore the available algorithms for computing these functions (e.g., Chebyshev polynomials
for trigonometric functions) and build protocols that optimize performance in each of the chosen
settings of two-party and multi-party computation. Our optimizations for designing the building
blocks as well as the overall protocols focus on the specific costs of the underlying techniques for
secure arithmetic and ensure that we achieve efficiency together with precision and provable security
guarantees.
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Prot.
Secret sharing Garbled circuits
Rounds Interactive operations XOR gates Non-XOR gates
Add/Sub 0 0 4` `
LT 4 4`− 2 3` `
EQ 4 `+ 4 log ` ` `
Mul 1 : 4 1 : 2k + 2 4`2 − 4` 2`2 − `
Div − : 3 log `+ 2ξ + 12 − : 1.5` log `+ 2`ξ 7`2 + 7` 3`2 + 3`
+10.5`+ 4ξ + 6
PreMul 2 : 2 logm+ 2 3m− 1 : (m− 1)(2k + 2) − −
Max/Min 4 logm+ 1 4`(m− 1) 5`(m− 1) 2`(m− 1)
Int2FP 0 0 0 0
FP2Int 3 2k + 1 0 0
Comp logm+ log logm+ 3
m logm log logm+ 4m logm (`+ 4)m logm (2`+ 1)m logm− 2`m
−m+ logm+ 2 −m`− 4 logm+ ` +(`− 1) logm+ 2`
Sort 2 logm(logm+ 1) + 1
`(m− 0.25)(log2m 1.5m`(log2m 0.5m`(log2m
+ logm+ 4) + logm+ 4) + logm+ 4)
Lookup 5 m logm+ 4m log logm+m m`+ logm− ` m logm+m(`− 1)
Table 1: Performance of known secure building blocks on integer and fixed-point values.
5.2.1 Sine, Cosine, and Arctangent
Here, we give secure building blocks for three trigonometric functions, which are sine, cosine, and
arctangent. We denote secure protocols as [b] ← Sin([a]), [b] ← Cos([a]), and [b] ← Arctan([a]) for
each respective function. The output b is a fixed-point value, while the input a (for sine and cosine)
represented in degrees can be either integer or fixed-point. For generality, we will assume that a
used with trigonometric functions is also a fixed-point value, while slight optimizations are possible
when a is known to be an integer (as in the fingerprint algorithms considered in this work).
There are a variety of different approximation algorithms that can be used for trigonometric
functions, many of which take the form of polynomial evaluation. The best option should combine
high precision with low computational complexity. Chebyshev polynomials are often used for simple
operations including trigonometric functions [44], but based on the application and desired precision
different approaches can be used. For instance, [39] proposed a secure sine protocol using Taylor
series for floating-point numbers.
Upon examining the options, we chose to proceed with the polynomials described in [33, Chap-
ter 6], as they achieve good precision using only small degree polynomials. The polynomials
used in [33] for trigonometric functions take the form P (x2) or xP (x2) for some polynomial P over
variable x (i.e., use only odd or even powers), which requires one to compute only half as many
multiplications as in a polynomial with all powers present.
Another very different approach is to precompute the values of these functions for the desired
precision and the range of input values and use private lookup to select the output based on private
input. This approach was recently pursued in [53], but has scaling issues for general function
evaluation. We elaborate on the possibility of using this approach in Appendix A.1, while this
section treats the more general solution based on polynomial evaluation.
The approach used in [33] offers two types of polynomial approximations. The first type uses
a regular polynomial P (x) of degree N to approximate the desired function. The second type uses
a rational function of the form P (x)/Q(x), where P and Q are polynomials of degree N and M ,
respectively. For the same desired precision, the second option will yield lower degrees N and M
and thus fewer multiplications to approximate the function. This option, however, is undesirable
when the division operation is much costlier than the multiplication operation. In our setting,
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the rational form is preferred in the case of GC evaluation (at least for higher precisions) where
multiplication and division have similar costs. However, with SS, the cost of division is much higher
than that of multiplication, and we use the first option with regular polynomial evaluation.
It is assumed in [33] that the initial range reduction to [0, pi/2] is used for the input to trigono-
metric functions. This means that if input a to sine or cosine is given in degrees, it needs to
be reduced to the range [0, 90] and normalized to the algorithm’s expectations. Note that it is
straightforward to extend the result of the computation to cover the entire range [0, 2pi] given the
output of this function and the original input.
Furthermore, because evaluating trigonometric functions on a smaller range of inputs offers
higher precision, it is possible to apply further range reduction and evaluate the function on even
a smaller range of inputs, after which the range is expanded using an appropriate formula or
segmented evaluation. We refer the reader to [33] for additional detail. For that reason, the tables
of polynomial coefficients provided in [33] are for sin(αpix) and cos(βpix), where 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and α
and β are fixed constants equal to 1/2 or less. To see the benefit provided by smaller α or β, for
example, consider the sine function. Then by using α = 1/2 and approximating the function using
a regular polynomial of degree 7, we obtain precision to 15.85 decimal places, while with α = 1/6
and the same polynomial degree 25.77 decimal places of the output can be computed. However, for
simplicity, in this work we suggest to choose α and β equal to 1/2, as this option will not require
non-trivial post-computation to compensate for the effect of computing the function on a different
angle.
Based on the desired precision, one can retrieve the minimum necessary polynomial degree used
in the approximation to achieve the desired precision, then look up the polynomial coefficients
and evaluate the polynomial or polynomials on the input. As mentioned before, for trigonometric
functions only polynomials with even or odd powers are used, and we have that sine is approximated
as xP (x2) or xP (x2)/Q(x2) (odd powers) and cosine as P (x2) or P (x2)/Q(x2) (even powers). Thus,
in when a rational function is used to evaluate sine, we obtain the following secure protocol. It
assumes that the input is given in degrees in the range [0, 360).
[b]← Sin([a])
1. Compute [s] = LT(180, [a]).
2. If ([s]) then [a] = [a]− 180.
3. If (LT(90, [a])) then [a] = 180− [a].
4. Compute [x] = 190 [a] and then [w] = [x]
2.
5. Lookup the minimum polynomial degrees N and M using α = 1/2 for which precision of the approx-
imation is at least k bits.
6. Lookup polynomial coefficients p0, . . ., pN and q0, . . ., qM for sine approximation.
7. Compute ([z1], . . . , [zmax(N,M)])← PreMul([w],max(N,M)).
8. Set [yP ] = p0 +
∑N
i=1 pi[zi].
9. Set [yQ] = q0 +
∑M
i=1 qi[zi].
10. Compute [y]← Div([yP ], [yQ]).
11. If ([s]) then [b] = 0− [x] else [b] = [x].
12. Compute and return [b] = [b] · [y].
Recall that we recommend using a rational function in the form of P (x)/Q(x) as in the above
protocol for GCs-based implementation of high precision. With SS, we modify the protocol to
evaluate only a single polynomial P of (a different) degree N and skip the division operation in
step 10. Also, based on our calculations, the single polynomial variant is also slightly faster in the
GC setting when precision is not high (e.g., with 16 bits of precision).
As far as optimizations go, we, as usual, simultaneously execute independent operations in
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the SS setting. Also, note that because coefficients pi’s and qj ’s are not integers, evaluations of
polynomials in steps 8 and 9 is not local in the SS setting and requires truncation. We, however,
can reduce the cost of truncating N (respectively, M) values to the cost of one truncation. This
is because we first add the products and truncate the sum once. This also applies to polynomial
evaluation in other protocols such as cosine and arctangent.
When input a is known to lie in the range [0, 90] (as in the fingerprint algorithms we consider in
this work), steps 1, 2, 3, 11, and 12 are not executed and instead we return [y] · [x] after evaluating
step 10. Lastly, when input a is known to be an integer, the comparisons in steps 1 and 3 and
the multiplication of [a] and a fixed-point constant 190 in step 4 become more efficient in both SS
and GCs-based implementations (i.e., both settings benefit from the reduced bitlength of a if only
integer part is stored and the cost of the multiplication in the SS setting becomes 1 interactive
operation).
To show security of this protocol, we need to build simulators according to Definition 1. The
main argument here is that because we only use secure building blocks that do not reveal any
private information, we apply Canetti’s composition theorem [21] to result in security of the overall
construction. More precisely, to simulate the adversarial view, we invoke simulators corresponding
to the building blocks. In more detail, if we assume an implementation based on a (n, τ)-threshold
linear secret sharing, our protocols inherit the same security guarantees as those of the building
blocks (i.e., perfect or statistical security in the presence of secure channels between the parties with
at most τ corrupt computational parties) because no information about private values is revealed
throughout the computation. More formally, to comply with the security definition, it is rather
straightforward to build a simulator for our protocols by invoking simulators of the corresponding
building blocks to result in the environment that will be indistinguishable from the real protocol
execution by the participants. The same argument applies to other protocols presented in this work
and we do not include explicit analysis (with the exception of selection).
The cosine function is evaluated similarly to sine. The main difference is in the way the input
is pre- and post-processed for polynomial evaluation due to the behavior of this function. When
cosine is evaluated using a rational function, we have the following secure protocol:
[b]← Cos([a])
1. If (LT(180, [a])) then [a] = 360− [a].
2. [s] = LT(90, [a]).
3. If ([s]) then [a] = 180− [a].
4. Compute [x] = 190 [a] and then [x] = [x]
2.
5. Lookup the minimum polynomial degrees N and M using β = 1/2 for which precision of the approx-
imation is at least k bits.
6. Lookup polynomial coefficients p0, . . ., pN and q0, . . ., qM for cosine approximation.
7. Compute ([z1], . . . , [zmax(N,M)])← PreMul([x],max(N,M)).
8. Set [yP ] = p0 +
∑N
i=1 pi[zi].
9. Set [yQ] = q0 +
∑M
i=1 qi[zi].
10. Compute [y]← Div([yP ], [yQ]).
11. If ([s]) then [b] = 0− [y] else [b] = [y].
12. Return [b].
The same optimizations as those described for the sine protocol apply to the cosine computation
as well. Furthermore, to use a single polynomial to evaluate cosine, we similarly lookup coefficients
for a single polynomial of (a different) degree N and skip steps 9 and 10 in the Cos protocol.
Complexities of Sin and Cos are provided in Table 2 as function of parameters N and M . To
achieve 16, 32, or 64 bits of precision, N needs to be set to 3, 5, or 9, respectively, for both Sin and
17
Prot.
Secret sharing Garbled circuits
Rounds Interactive operations XOR gates Non-XOR gates
Sin 2 logN + 16 2Nk + 8`+ 2N + 6k + 4
(max(N,M) +N +M + 2) (max(N,M) +N +M + 2)
×(4`2 − 4`) + 7`2 ×(2`2 − `) + 3`2
+4`(N +M) + 31` +`(N +M) + 11`
Cos 2 logN + 15 2Nk + 8`+ 2N + 4k + 2
(max(N,M) +N +M + 1) (max(N,M) +N +M + 1)
×(4`2 − 4`) + 7`2 ×(2`2 − `) + 3`2
+4`(N +M) + 31` +`(N +M) + 11`
Arctan
2 logN + 3 log ` 1.5` log `+ 2` log( `3.5 ) + 2Nk 8N`2 + 3`2 − 4N`+ 43` 4N`2 + `2 −N`+ 15`
+2 log( `3.5 ) + 22 +18.5`+ 2 + 4 log(
`
3.5 ) + 6
Sqrt
0.5`+ 2 log ` 2`2 + ` log `+ 3k(ξ + 1) 12ξ`2 + 12.5`2 − k2 + `k 6ξ`2 + 6.5`2 − k2 + `k
+6ξ + 24 +5`+ 6ξ + 12 −8ξ`− 7.5`+ k − 2 −2ξ`− 0.5`+ k − 4
Select
c(2 log2 t1 c(`(t1 − 0.25)(log2 t1 + log t1 + 4) c(1.5t1`(log2 t1 + log t1 + 4) c(0.5t1`(log2 t1 + log t1 + 4)
+2 log2 t2 +`(t2 − 0.25)(log2 t2 + log t2 + 4) +1.5t2`(log2 t2 + log t2 + 4) +0.5t2`(log2 t2 + log t2 + 4)
+6 logm+ 2 +2m logm log logm+ 8m logm+ +(2`+ 20.5)m logm+m +(4`+ 5)m logm+m
log logm+ 17) 18m`− 5.5m+ 2 logm− 8`+ 9) +12.5m`− 6 logm− 8`) +4m`+ (2`− 1) logm)
Table 2: Performance of proposed secure building blocks for fixed-point values.
Cos using a single polynomial, and (N,M) need to be set to (2, 1), (3, 2), and (6, 2), respectively,
for Sin using the rational function approach.
In the case of inverse trigonometric functions and arctangent in particular, the function input
domain is the entire (−∞,∞) and the range of output is (−pi/2, pi/2). We recall that arctangent
is an odd function (i.e., arctan(−x) = − arctan(x)) and for all positive inputs we have arctan(x) +
arctan( 1x) = pi/2. It is, therefore, sufficient to approximate arctangent over the interval of [0, 1].
To this end, we use the technique introduced by Medina in [50] and its formal proof in [29]. In
particular, [50] defines a sequence of polynomials over the input domain of [0, 1], denoted as hN (x),
with the property that
|hN (x)− arctan(x)| ≤
(
1
45/8
)deg(hN )+1
.
We use this formula to determine the degree N for any k-bit precision. This degree N is logarithmic
with respect to the desired precision. Afterwards, the coefficients of hN (x) are computed from the
recursive definitions in [50]. We choose this approach over other alternatives such as [33] for its
efficiency. As an example, in [33] the authors propose to divide [0,∞) into s+ 1 segments for some
value of s and perform a search to discover in which interval the input falls. Afterwards, the input
is transformed into another variable (involving division) whose value is guaranteed to be within a
small fixed interval and arctangent of this new variable is approximated using standard polynomial
approximation techniques. In this approach, the search can be performed using binary search trees
whose secure realization is non-trivial or alternatively will involve s steps. This extra computation
makes the overall performance of the solution in [33] worse than that of [50]’s approach used
here. Another candidate for arctangent evaluation is the well-known Taylor series of arctangent.
However, Taylor series provides possibly reasonable precision if the input is bound to be very close
to one point from the input domain, which we cannot assume. In addition, arctangent Taylor series
converges very slowly. For example, for a three decimal precision on inputs around 0.95 Taylor
series requires a polynomial of degree 57, whereas [50]’s approach requires a 7th-degree polynomial
[29]. Our secure protocol to approximate arctangent based on the approach from [50] is given next:
[b]← Arctan([a])
1. Compute [s]← LT([a], 0).
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2. If ([s]) then [x] = 0− [a] else [x] = [a].
3. Compute [c]← LT(1, [x]).
4. If ([c]) then [d] = pi/2, [y]← Div(1, [x]); else [d] = 0, [y] = [x].
5. Lookup the minimum polynomial degree N for which precision of the approximation is at least k bits.
6. Lookup polynomial coefficients p0, . . ., pN for arctangent approximation from [50].
7. Compute ([z1], . . . , [zN ])← PreMul([y], N).
8. Set [z] = p0 +
∑N
i=1 pi[zi].
9. If ([c]) then [z] = [d]− [z] else [z] = [d] + [z].
10. If ([s]) then [b] = 0− [z] else [b] = [z].
11. Return [b].
The complexity of this protocol can be found in Table 2 .
Security analysis. To show security of Sin, Cos, and Arctan, we build simulators according
to Definition 1 that simulate the adversarial view without access to private inputs of honest par-
ties. The main argument is that because we only use secure building blocks that do not reveal
any information about private inputs and compute the output in a protected form, we can apply
Canetti’s composition theorem [21] to result in security of the overall construction. More precisely,
to simulate the adversarial view, we invoke simulators corresponding to the building blocks. Sup-
pose a setup based on a (n, τ)-threshold linear SS is used; our protocols inherit the same security
guarantees as those of the building blocks (i.e., perfect or statistical security in the presence of
secure channels between the parties with at most τ corrupt computational parties) because no in-
formation about private values is revealed throughout the computation. More formally, it is rather
straightforward to build a simulator for our protocols by invoking simulators of the corresponding
building blocks to result in the environment that will be indistinguishable from the real protocol
execution by the participants. A detailed simulator to prove security of the Sin protocol is given
in the following. The same argument applies to other protocols presented in this work and we do
not include explicit analysis (with the exception of selection, where some intermediate values are
opened during protocol execution).
Theorem 1 Protocol Sin is secure according to Definition 1.
Proof. For concreteness of the proof, let us assume a SS setting with n computational parties from
which at most τ < n2 are corrupt. In the ideal world, SI simulates the view of the corrupted parties
I. It is given access to the corrupted parties’ inputs (inI) and their outputs (fI(in1, . . ., inn)). In
the current formulation of Sin, the input a is provided in the form of secret shares and thus is not
available to a participant in the clear and similarly output b is computed in a shared form and is
not given to any given party. We, however, also consider the variant when the output is opened to
a corrupt participant from I, in which case the simulator obtains access to b and must ensure that
the adversary is able to reconstruct the correct output b.
We build SI as follows: during step 1 of Sin, SI invokes the simulator for LT. In step 2, SI
invokes simulator for (integer) multiplication used in executing the conditional statements (note
that subtraction is local). Similarly, in step 3, SI invokes both simulators for LT and (integer)
multiplication to simulate conditional execution. In steps 4, 8, and 9, SI invokes a simulator
for floating-point multiplication several times. In steps 7 and 10, SI invokes the simulators for
(floating-point) prefix multiplication and divisions, respectively. Step 11 is simulated in the same
way as step 2. In step 12, SI invokes the simulator for floating-point multiplication. If no party in
I is entitled to learning output b, SI simply communicates random shares to the corrupted parties.
Otherwise, SI has b and uses it to set shares of honest parties’ output in such a way that the shares
reconstruct to the correct output b (honest parties’ shares will be consequently communicated to
19
the output recipient). This is always possible because τ or fewer shares are independent of a secret
and the remaining shares can be set to enable reconstruction of any desired value.
5.2.2 Square Root
We now proceed with the square root computation defined by the interface [b] ← Sqrt([a]), where
a and b are fixed-point values to cover the general case.
Secure multi-party computation of the square root based on SS has been treated by Liedel in [47].
The approach is based on the Goldschmidt’s algorithm, which is faster than the Newton-Raphson’s
method. However, to eliminate the accumulated errors, the last iteration of the algorithm is replaced
with the self-correcting iteration of the Newton-Raphson’s method. For an `-bit input a with k bits
after the radix point, this protocol uses 2`2 + ` log `+ 3k(ξ+ 1) + 5`+ 6ξ+ 12 interactive operations
in 0.5` + 2 log ` + 6ξ + 24 rounds, where ` is assumed to be a power of 2 and ξ = dlog2(`/5.4)e is
the number of algorithm iterations. For the purposes of this work, we use the protocol from [47]
for the SS setting. We also optimize the computation to be used with GCs based on the specifics
of that technique as described next. Furthermore, because polynomial approximation (similar to
the way it was done for trigonometric functions in section 5.2.1) is attractive in the SS setting, we
provide an alternative solution in Appendix A.2.
Goldschmidt’s method starts by computing an initial approximation for 1√
a
, denoted by b0, that
satisfies 12 ≤ ab20 < 32 . It then proceeds in iterations increasing the precision of the approximation
with each consecutive iteration. To approximate 1√
a
, [47] uses an efficient method (a linear equation)
that expects that input a is in the range [12 , 1). Thus, there is a need to first normalize a to a
′ such
that 12 ≤ a′ < 1 and a = a′ · 2w. Note that 1√a = 1√a′
√
2−w, therefore, once we approximate 1√
a′
,
we can multiply it by
√
2−w to determine an approximation of 1√
a
.
In our (`, k)-bit fixed-point representation, a normalized input a′ ∈ [12 , 1) has the most significant
non-zero bit exactly at position k − 1. We also express
√
2−w as 1√
2
2−b
w
2
c when w is odd and as
2−b
w
2
c when w is even. Our normalization procedure Norm that we present next thus takes input a
and returns 12 ≤ a′ < 1 (normalized input a in (`, k)-bit fixed-point representation), 2−b
w
2
c and bit
c set to 1 when w is odd and to 0 otherwise. The protocol is optimized for the GC approach with
cheap XOR gates [42]. It assumes that ` and k are even.
〈[a′], [2−bw2 c], [c]〉 ← Norm([a])
1. ([a`−1], . . . , [a0])← [a].
2. Set [x`−1] = [a`−1].
3. For i = `− 2, . . . , 0 do [xi] = [ai] ∨ [xi+1].
4. Set [y`−1] = [x`−1].
5. For i = 0, . . ., `− 2 do in parallel [yi] = [xi]⊕ [xi+1].
6. For i = 0, . . . , `− 1 do in parallel [z(i)]← ([a`−1] ∧ [yi], . . . , [a0] ∧ [yi]).
7. Compute [a′] =
(⊕k−1
i=0
(
[z(i)] (k − 1− i)))⊕ (⊕`−1i=k ([z(i)] (i− (k − 1)))).
8. Let [u0] = [y0], [u `
2
] = [y`−1] and for i = 1, . . ., `2 − 1 do in parallel [ui] = [y2i−1]⊕ [y2i].
9. Set [2−b
w
2 c]← ([d`−1], . . ., [d0]) = (0`− 3k2 −1, [u0], [u1], . . ., [u `
2
], 0
3k−`
2 ), where 0x corresponds to x zeros.
10. Set [c] =
⊕ `
2−1
i=0 [y2i].
11. Return 〈[a′], [2−bw2 c], [c]〉.
Here, lines 2–3 preserve the most significant zero bits of a and set the remaining bits to 1 in variable
x (i.e., all bits following the most significant non-zero bit are 1). Lines 4–5 compute y as a vector
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with the most significant non-zero bit of a set to 1 and all other bits set to 0. On line 6, each
vector z(i) is either filled with 0s or set to a depending on the ith bit of y (thus, all but one z(i) can
be non-zero). Line 7 computes the normalized value of a by aggregating all vectors z(i) shifted an
appropriate number of positions. Here operation x y shifts `-bit representation of x y positions
to the left by discarding y most significant bits of x and appending y 0s in place of least significant
bits. Similarly, x y shifts x to the right by prepending y 0s in place of most significant bits and
discarding y least significant bits of x. Note that we can use cheap XOR gates for this aggregation
operation because at most one yi can take a non-zero value.
Lines 8 and 9 compute [2−b
w
2
c]. Because a pair of consecutive i’s results in the same value of w,
we first combine the pairs on line 8 and shift them in place on line 9. As before, we can use cheap
XOR and free shift operations to accomplish this task because at most one yi is set. Lastly, line 10
computes the bit c, which is set by combining all flags yi’s at odd distances from k − 1.
Note that for simplicity of exposition, we AND and XOR all bits in steps 6 and 7. There is,
however, no need to compute the AND for the bits discarded in step 7 or compute the XOR with
newly appended or prepended 0s. We obtain that this protocol can be implemented as a circuit
using 0.5`2 − k2 + `k + 1.5`− 4 non-XOR and 0.5`2 − k2 + `k + 0.5`− 3 XOR gates.
Once we determine normalized input a′, Liedel [47] approximates 1√
a′
, denoted by b′0, by a linear
equation b′0 = αa′ + β, where α and β are precomputed. The values of these coefficients are set
to α = −0.8099868542 and β = 1.787727479 in [47] to compute an initial approximation b′0 with
almost 5.5 bits of precision (when a′ is in the range [12 , 1)). We then use b
′
0 to compute b0 that
approximates 1√
a
as described above.
After the initialization, Goldschmidt’s algorithm sets g0 = xb0 and h0 = 0.5b0 and proceeds in
ξ iterations that compute: gi+1 = gi(1.5−gihi), hi+1 = hi(1.5−gihi). The last iteration is replaced
with one iteration of Newton-Raphson’s method to eliminate accumulated errors that computes
the following: hi+1 = hi(1.5 − 0.5ah2i ). This gives us the following square root protocol, which we
present optimized for the GC approach.
[b]← Sqrt([a])
1. Let ξ = dlog2( `5.4 )e.
2. Execute 〈[a′], [2−bw2 c], [c]〉 ← Norm([a]).
3. Let α = −0.8099868542, β = 1.787727479 and compute [b′0] = α · [a′] + β.
4. Compute [b0] =
((
[c] ∧ 1√
2
)
⊕ ¬[c]
)
· [2−bw2 c] · [b′0].
5. Compute [g0] = [a] · [b0] and [h0] = ([b0] 1).
6. For i = 0, . . . , ξ − 2 do
(a) [x] = 1.5− [gi] · [hi].
(b) if (i < ξ − 2) then [gi+1] = [gi] · [x].
(c) [hi+1] = [hi] · [x].
7. Compute [hξ] = [hξ−1](1.5− ([a] · [hξ−1]2  1)).
8. Return [b] = [hξ].
Here multiplication by 0.5 is replaced by shift to the right by 1 bit that has no cost. Complexity
of this protocol can be found in Table 2 .
5.2.3 Selection
There are multiple ways to find the fth smallest element of a set. The most straightforward method
is to obliviously sort the input set and return the fth element of the sorted set. This approach
is often beneficial when the input set is small. As a general solution, it is usually faster to use
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a selection algorithm, and the goal of this section is to design an oblivious selection protocol for
finding the fth smallest element of a set. One compelling alternative is to perform a random shuffle
followed by a regular selection algorithm [32] such as quickselect (similar to the way some sorting
algorithms work) and we discuss this option at the end of this section. The only other publication
that studied selection in the context of SMC was [3], but it assumed that set elements are known
to the participants, which is not applicable to this work.
The regular non-oblivious selection algorithms run in O(m) time on m-element sets. We consid-
ered both deterministic and probabilistic algorithms and settled on a probabilistic algorithm that
performs the best in the secure setting in practice. Its complexity is O(m logm) due to the use
of data-oblivious compaction. Goodrich [31] proposed a probabilistic oblivious selection algorithm
that works in linear time (there are also selection networks such as [46] of higher complexity). Our
starting point, however, is a different simpler algorithm that performs well in practice. Our algo-
rithm proceeds by scanning through the input set and selects each element with probability c1√
m
for some constant c1. The expected number of selected elements is O(
√
m). The algorithm then
sorts the selected elements and determines two elements x and y between which the fth smallest
element is expected to lie based on f , m, and the number of selected elements. Afterwards, we
scan the input set again retrieving all elements with values between x and y and simultaneously
computing the ranks of x and y in the input set; let rx and ry denote the ranks. The expected
number of retrieved elements is O(
√
m). We sort the retrieved elements and return the element at
position f − rx in the sorted set. Let t1 denote the number of elements randomly selected in the
beginning of the algorithm and t2 denote the number of elements with values between x and y.
Because of the randomized nature of our algorithm, it can fail at multiple points of execution.
In particular, if the number of elements selected in the beginning is too large or too small (and
the performance guarantees cannot be met), we abort. Similarly, if the number of the retrieved
elements that lie between x and y is too small, we abort. Lastly, if f does not lie between the ranks
of x and y, the fth smallest element will not be among the retrieved elements and we abort. It can
be shown using the union bound that all of these events happen with a probability negligible in
the input size. By using the appropriate choice of constants we can also ensure that faults are very
rare in practice (see below). Thus, in the rare event of failure, the algorithm needs to be restarted
using new random choices, and the expected number of times the algorithm is to be executed is
slightly above 1.
Our protocol Select is given below. Compared to the algorithm structure outlined above, we
need to ensure high probability of success through the appropriate selection of x and y as well
as some constant parameters. We also need to ensure that the execution can proceed obliviously
without compromising private data. To achieve this, we use three constants c1, c2, and cˆ. The
value of c1 influences the probability with which an element is selected in the beginning of the
algorithm. The value of cˆ influences the distance between x and y in the set of t1 selected elements.
In particular, we first determine the position where f is expected to be positioned among the t1
selected elements as (ft1)/m. We then choose x to be cˆ elements before that position and choose
y to be 3cˆ elements after that position. Lastly, c2 is used to control the size of t2. When t2 is too
small due to the random choices made during the execution, we abort.
To turn this logic into a data-oblivious protocol, we resort to secure and oblivious set operations.
In particular, after we mark each element of the input set as selected or not selected, we use data-
oblivious compaction to place all selected elements in the beginning of the set. Similarly, we use
data-oblivious sorting to sort t1 and t2 elements.
[b]← Select(〈[a1], . . . , [am]〉, f)
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1. Set constants c1, c2, and cˆ; also set n =
√
m, [t1] = 0, [t2] = 0.
2. For i = 1, . . . ,m set [bi] = 0.
3. For i = 1, . . . ,m do in parallel
(a) Generate random [ri] ∈ Zn.
(b) If LT([ri], c1) then [bi] = 1.
4. For i = 1, . . . ,m do [t1] = [t1] + [bi].
5. Open the value of t1.
6. If ((t1 > 2c1n) ∨ (t1 < 12c1n)) then abort.
7. Execute 〈[a′1], . . . , [a′m]〉 ← Comp(〈[b1], [a1] ∧ [b1]〉, . . . , 〈[bm], [am] ∧ [bm]〉).
8. Execute 〈[a′′1 ], . . . , [a′′t1 ]〉 ← Sort([a′1], . . . , [a′t1 ]).
9. Compute k as the closest integer to (ft1)/m.
10. If (k − cˆ < 1) then [x]← Min([a1], . . . , [am]); else [x] = [a′′k−cˆ].
11. If (k + 3cˆ > t1) then [y]← Max([a1], . . . , [am]); else [y] = [a′′k+3cˆ].
12. Set [rx] = 0 and [ry] = 0.
13. For i = 1, . . . ,m do in parallel [gi] = LT([ai], [x]) and [g
′
i] = LT([ai], [y]).
14. For i = 1, . . . ,m do in parallel [b′i] = ¬[gi] ∧ [g′i].
15. For i = 1, . . . ,m do [rx] = [rx] + [gi] and [t2] = [t2] + [b
′
i].
16. Open the values of rx and t2.
17. If ((t2 < 4cˆc2n) ∨ ((f − rx) < 0) ∨ ((f − rx) > t2)) then abort.
18. Execute 〈[d1], . . . , [dm]〉 ← Comp(〈[b′1], [a1] ∧ [b′1]〉, . . . , 〈[b′m], [am] ∧ [b′m]〉).
19. Execute 〈[d′1], . . . , [d′t2 ]〉 ← Sort([d1], . . . , [dt2 ]).
20. Return [b] = [d′f−rx ].
Note that because maximum and minimum functions are evaluated on the same set, we reduce
the overhead of evaluating them simultaneously compared to evaluating them individually. In
particular, when min and max functions are evaluated in a tree-like fashion on an m-element set,
we use the m/2 comparison in the first layer to set both minimum and maximum elements of each
pair using the same cost as evaluating only one of them. The rest is evaluated as before, and we
save about 1/2 overhead of one of min or max.
Complexity of this protocol is given in Table 2 as a function of m, t1, t2, c, and bitlength `. The
expected value of t1 is c1
√
m, the expected value of t2 is (4cˆ
√
m)/c1, and c indicates the average
number of times the algorithm needs to be invoked, which is a constant slightly larger than 1 (see
below). We experimentally determined the best values for c1, c2, and cˆ for different values of n
to ensure high success of the algorithm. Based on the experiments, we recommend to set c1 = 2,
c2 = 2, and cˆ = 10. Using these values, the probability of the protocol’s failure on a single run is
at most a few percent up to input size 10,000. With larger input sizes, a larger value of cˆ might be
preferred.
As far as alternative constructions go, the goal can be achieved using oblivious sorting. A
random shuffle followed by a quicksort, where the results of private comparisons are opened, was
determined to be among the fastest sorting algorithms [19]. This solution, however, is not com-
petitive with our algorithm. A better approach is to run quickselect after a shuffle. This solution
is not competitive with our algorithm in the GC setting because of the random shuffle cost. Fur-
thermore, because many values are opened at intermediate steps of the computation to determine
what comparisons are to be performed next, the circuit can no longer be garbled at once and needs
to be assembled during the computation.
The situation is different with SS, for which a fast random shuffle algorithm is known [45]. In
its general form it requires O(2nn3/2m logm) interactive operations in O( 2
n√
n
) rounds, but when
the number of parties n is a small constant, it is very efficient. For example, with n = 3 and
computationally-bounded adversaries it uses 3(2m + α) interactive operations in 4 rounds, where
α is proportional to the computational security parameter. Quickselect additionally performs on
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average about 4m comparisons, which translates into close to 16`m interactive operations in 4 logm
rounds. Our Select has an additive term with 18`m interactive operations and thus is expected to
be somewhat slower for this setting.
We can thus conclude that Select is an attractive choice with GCs or for the SS setting when
the number of computational parties is not very small or when the high worst-case behavior of
quickselect is unacceptable. In general, our construction is a versatile solution that exhibits good
performance in any setting and has low worst-case complexity.
Security analysis. The Select protocol is designed using secure building blocks listed in Section
5.1. Unlike all other protocols in this work, three values t1, t2, and rx privately computed in Select
are opened during its execution. Thus, to guarantee security based on Canetti’s composition
theorem [21] similar to other protocols, we need to show that these values are independent of the
private input set and result in no information leakage, and as a result the overall Select protocol
is secure. First, observe that the value of t1 is computed purely based on random choices made
in step 3(a). Thus, its value is data-independent. Second, the rank of x rx is determined by
random choices, but not the data values themselves. Similarly, the value of t2 depends only on the
ranks of the randomly chosen pivots, but not on the actual data values. Therefore, execution is
data-oblivious and security is maintained.
6 Secure Fingerprint Recognition
We are now ready to proceed with describing our solutions for secure fingerprint recognition using
the building blocks introduced in Section 5. We provide three constructions, one for each fingerprint
recognition approach in Section 3.
6.1 Secure Fingerprint Recognition using Brute Force Geometrical Transfor-
mation
The easiest way to execute all (non-secure) fingerprint recognition algorithms in Section 3 is to
use floating-point representation. We, however, choose to utilize integer and fixed-point arithmetic
in their secure counterparts to reduce overhead associated with secure execution. In particular,
typically minutia coordinates (xi, yi) as well as their orientation θi are represented as integers.
This means that all inputs in Algorithm 1, the first fingerprint matching algorithm based on brute
force geometrical transformation, are integers and computing the number of matched minutiae
using Algorithm 2 can also be performed on integers. The output of sine and cosine functions in
step 2(b) of Algorithm 1, however, are not integers and we utilize fixed-point representation for
their values. Moreover, after the minutia points are transformed, we can truncate the transformed
coordinates x′′i and y
′′
i and use their integer representation in Algorithm 2.
Our secure implementation of Algorithm 1 is given below as protocol GeomTransFR. It uses the
same logic as Algorithm 1 with the difference that the computation of the maximum matching is
performed outside the main for-loop to reduce the number of rounds in the SS setting.
([Cmax], 〈[∆xmax], [∆ymax], [∆θmax]〉) ← GeomTransFR (T = {ti = ([xi], [yi], [θi])}mi=1, S = {si = ([x′i], [y′i],
[θ′i])}ni=1)
1. [Cmax] = [0];
2. For i = 1, . . . ,m and j = 1, . . . , n, compute in parallel:
(a) [∆xi,j ] = [x
′
j ]− [xi], [∆yi,j ] = [y′j ]− [yi], and [∆θi,j ] = [θ′j ]− [θi].
(b) [ci,j ] = Sin([∆θi,j ]) and [c
′
i,j ] = Cos([∆θi,j ]).
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(c) For k = 1, . . . , n, compute in parallel [x
(k)
i,j ] = [c
′
i,j ] · [x′k] + [ci,j ] · [y′k] − [∆xi,j ], [y(k)i,j ] = [c′i,j ] ·
[y′k] − [ci,j ] · [x′k] − [∆yi,j ], and [θ(k)i,j ] = [θ′k] − [∆θi,j ] and save the computed points as Si,j =
{([x(k)i,j ], [y(k)i,j ], [θ(k)i,j ])}nk=1.
(d) Compute the number [Ci,j ] of matched minutiae between T and Si,j using protocol Match.
3. Compute the largest matching 〈[Cmax], [∆xmax], [∆ymax], [∆θmax]〉 = Max(〈[C1,1], [∆x1,1], [∆y1,1],
[∆θ1,1]〉, . . . , 〈[Cm,n]), [∆xm,n]), [∆ym,n], [∆θm,n]〉).
4. Return [Cmax] and the corresponding alignment 〈[∆xmax], [∆ymax], [∆θmax]〉.
We obtain that all steps use integer arithmetic except step 2(b) (where sine and cosine have
integer inputs, but fixed-point outputs) and multiplications in step 2(c) take one integer and one
fixed-point operand (after which x
(k)
i,j and y
(k)
i,j are truncated to integer representation). Note that
the latter corresponds to some optimization of the computation, where instead of converting integers
x′k and y
′
k to fixed-point values and multiplying two fixed-point numbers, we can reduce the overhead
by multiplying an integer to a fixed-point value. This eliminates the cost of truncating the product
in the SS setting and reduces the cost of multiplication in the GC setting. Furthermore, we can also
optimize the point at which the fixed-point values are converted back to integers in the computation
of x
(k)
i,j and y
(k)
i,j in step 2(c) of the algorithm. In particular, in the SS setting we add the fixed-point
products and ∆x
(k)
i,j , ∆y
(k)
i,j converted to fixed-point representation (all of which have 0 cost), after
which the sum is converted to an integer (paying the price of truncation). In the GCs setting, on
the other hand, we could convert the products to integers first (which has 0 cost) and then perform
addition/subtraction on shorter integer values.
Our secure implementation of Algorithm 2 is given as protocol Match. All computation is
performed on integer values. Compared to the structure of Algorithm 2, there are a few notable
differences. First, note that instead of checking the
√
(xi − x′j)2 + (yi − y′j)2 < λ constraint, the
protocol checks the equivalent constraint (xi−x′j)2 + (yi− y′j)2 < λ2 to avoid using a costly square
root operation (and it is assumed that λ2 is supplied as part of the input instead of λ). Second,
to evaluate the constraint min(|θi − θ′j |, 360 − |θi − θ′j |) < λθ, instead of computing |θi − θ′j | the
protocol computes θi − θ′j or θ′j − θi depending on which value is positive and uses that value in
the consecutive computation. In addition, instead of computing the minimum, the computation
proceeds as (|θi − θ′j | < λθ) ∨ (360 − |θi − θ′j | < λθ) in steps 3(c) and 3(d) of the protocol, which
allows us to make the computation slightly faster. Because this computation is performed a large
number of times, even small improvements can have impact on the overall performance.
Similar to restructuring protocol GeomTransFR to maximize parallelism and lower the number
of rounds, in Match all distance and orientation constraints are evaluated in parallel in step 3. Then
step 4 iterates through all minutiae in T and constructs a matching between a minutia of T and an
available minutia from S within a close proximity to it (if any). Variable lj indicates whether the
jth minutia of fingerprint S is currently available (i.e., has not yet been paired up with another
minutia from T ). For each minutia, sj , marked as unavailable, its distance to the ith minutia in
T is set to λ2 to prevent it from being chosen for pairing the second time. Because step 4(d) is
written to run all loop iterations in parallel, there is a single variable Cj for each loop iteration, all
values of which are added together at the end of the loop (which is free using SS). With GCs this
parallelism is often not essential, and if the loop is executed sequentially, C can be incremented on
line 4(d) directly instead of using Cj ’s. (And if parallel computation is used, the sum on line 4(e)
will need to be implemented as the (free) XOR of all Cj .)
[C]← Match(T = {ti = ([xi], [yi], [θi])}mi=1, S = {si = ([x′i], [y′i], [θ′i])}ni=1, λ2, λθ)
1. Set [C] = [0].
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2. For j = 1, . . . , n, set in parallel [lj ] = [0].
3. For i = 1, . . . ,m and j = 1, . . . , n, compute in parallel:
(a) [di,j ] = ([xi]− [x′j ])2 + ([yi]− [y′j ])2.
(b) If LT([θi], [θ
′
j ]), then [ai,j ] = [θ
′
j ]− [θi], else [ai,j ] = [θi]− [θ′j ].
(c) [ci,j ] = LT([di,j ], [λ
2]), [c′i,j ] = LT([ai,j ], [λθ]), and [c
′′
i,j ] = LT((360− [ai,j ]), [λθ]).
(d) [vi,j ] = [ci,j ] ∧ ([c′i,j ] ∨ [c′′i,j ]).
4. For i = 1, . . . ,m, do
(a) For j = 1, . . . , n, do in parallel: if ([lj ] ∨ ¬[vi,j ]), then [di,j ] = λ2.
(b) Execute ([dmin], [jmin]) = Min([di,1], . . . , [di,n]).
(c) Set [u] = LT([dmin], λ
2).
(d) For j = 1, . . . , n, compute in parallel: if (EQ([jmin], j) ∧ [u]), then [Cj ] = [1] and [lj ] = [1], else
[Cj ] = [0].
(e) [C] = [C] +
∑n
j=1[Cj ].
5. Return [C].
The asymptotic complexity of GeomTransFR and Match remains similar to their original non-
secure counterparts. In particular, if we treat the bitlength of integer and fixed-point values as
constants, the complexity of GeomTransFR is O(n2m2) and Match is O(nm). Their round complex-
ity (for the SS setting) is O(m log n) and O(m log n), respectively. If we wish to include dependency
on the bitlengths ` and k, the complexity increases by at most a factor of O(`) in the SS setting
and at most a factor of O(`2) in the GCs setting due to the differences in the complexity of the
underlying operations.
6.2 Secure Fingerprint Recognition using High Curvature Points
We next treat our secure realization of fingerprint recognition using high curvature points from
Algorithm 3. The corresponding secure computation is provided as protocol HighCurvatureFR be-
low. It makes calls to a secure version of Algorithm 4, which we consequently call as protocol
OptimalMotion. Also, because of the complexity of the computation associated with finding the
closest points in step 3 of Algorithm 3, we provide the corresponding secure computation as a sepa-
rate protocol ClosestPoints. All computation is performed on fixed-point values with the exception
of step 7 of HighCurvatureFR, where a call to protocol Match is made.
([C], (R, v)) ← HighCurvatureFR(T = ({ti = ([xi], [yi], [θi])}mi=1, {tˆi = ([xˆi], [yˆi], [wˆi])}mˆi=1), S = ({si =
([x′i], [y
′
i], [θ
′
i])}ni=1, {sˆi = ([xˆ′i], [yˆ′i], [wˆ′i])}nˆi=1), f, γ, (α1, . . . , αγ), β, λ2, λθ)
1. Set [SLTS ] = [0].
2. For i = 1, . . . , nˆ, set s¯i = sˆi.
3. For ind = 1, . . . , γ do
(a) Execute {([di], t˜i)}nˆi=1 ← ClosestPoints({tˆi}mˆi=1, {sˆi}nˆi=1, αind).
(b) Execute [y]← Select(([d1], . . . , [dnˆ]), f).
(c) For i = 1, . . . , nˆ do in parallel [li] = LT([d
′
i], [y] + 1).
(d) Execute (([a1], b1, c1), . . . , ([anˆ], bnˆ, cnˆ))← Comp(([l1], sˆ1∧[l1], t˜1∧[l1]), . . ., ([lnˆ], sˆnˆ∧[lnˆ], t˜nˆ∧[lnˆ]))
using [li]’s as the keys.
(e) Compute the optimal motion (R, v)← OptimalMotion ({ci, bi}fi=1).
(f) For i = 1, . . . , nˆ transform the points in parallel as [x′′i ] = [v1] + [r11] · [xˆ′i] + [r12] · [yˆ′i] + [r13] · [wˆ′i],
[y′′i ] = [v2] + [r21] · [xˆ′i] + [r22] · [yˆ′i] + [r23] · [wˆ′i], and [w′′i ] = [v3] + [r31] · [xˆ′i] + [r32] · [yˆ′i] + [r33] · [wˆ′i],
then set sˆi = ([x
′′
i ], [y
′′
i ], [w
′′
i ]).
4. Execute (R, v)← OptimalMotion({s¯i, sˆi}nˆi=1).
5. Compute [c1] = Div([y¯2]− [y¯1], [x¯2]− [x¯1]), [c2] = Div([yˆ′2]− [yˆ′1], [xˆ′2]− [xˆ′1]), [c3] = Div([c1]− [c2], 1 +
[c1] · [c2]), and [∆θ] = Arctan([c3]).
6. For i = 1, . . . , n do in parallel [x′′i ] = [v1] + [r11] · [x′i] + [r12] · [y′i] and [y′′i ] = [v2] + [r21] · [x′i] + [r22] · [y′i],
then set si = ([x
′′
i ], [y
′′
i ], [θ
′
i]− [∆θ]).
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7. Compute the number [C] of matched minutiae by executing Match ({ti}mi=1, {si}ni=1, λ2, λθ).
8. Return [C], (R, v).
Different from Algorithm 3, our HighCurvatureFR proceeds using the maximum number of iter-
ations γ, as not to reveal the actual number of iterations needed (which depends on private inputs).
The remaining algorithm’s structure is maintained, where the computation is replaced with secure
and data-oblivious operations. In particular, in each iteration of step 3, we first determine the
closest high-curvature point from T to each (possibly transformed) high-curvature point from S
and compute f pairs with the smallest distances. Secure computation of the closest points using
protocol ClosestPoints is described below, while determining the closest f pairs is performed on
steps 3(b)–(d) as follows. After selecting the fth smallest element y among the computed distances
(step 3(b)), each distance is compared to that element (step 3(c)). We then proceed with pushing
all elements which are less than y to the beginning of the set using compaction (step 3(d)) and
consequently use the f smallest distances (located in the beginning of the set) for optimal motion
computation.
Once the closest f pairs and the corresponding optimal motion have been determined, the
protocol proceeds with applying the optimal motion to the high-curvature points in S. After
executing this computation a necessary number of times, the protocol computes the overall motion
in step 4 and applies it to the minutia points in the same way as in Algorithm 3. One thing to notice
is that HighCurvatureFR has additional (public) inputs compared to Algorithm 3. The parameters
α1, . . ., αγ specify bounding box sizes for the purposes of closest points computation in step 3(a)
(see below).
The protocol ClosestPoints below takes two sets of points ti’s and si’s (represented using three
coordinates each) and for each point si returns the closest element among the ti’s and the corre-
sponding distance. As mentioned in section 3.2, the TICP algorithm on which our construction
builds uses the bounding box approach to eliminate errors during this computation. In particular,
only points within a certain distance from a point are considered, and the maximum allowable
distance (i.e., the bounding box size) is denoted by αi in the ith iteration of HighCurvatureFR or
Algorithm 3. The sizes of the bounding boxes become smaller with each iteration as the two sets
of points become closer to each other. When we make a call to ClosestPoints, we pass a single
bounding box size for the current iteration and that parameter is denoted as α in the interface of
ClosestPoints.
{([di], t˜i)}nˆi=1 ← ClosestPoints({ti = (xi, yi, wi)}mˆi=1, {si = (x′i, y′i, w′i)}nˆi=1, α, β)
1. For i = 1, . . . , nˆ and for j = 1, . . . , mˆ do in parallel:
(a) Set [d(i,j)] = Sqrt([xˆj ]− [xˆ′i])2 + ([yˆj ]− [yˆ′i])2.
(b) If (LT([wˆj ], [wˆ
′
i])) then [a(i,j)] = [wˆ
′
i]− [wˆj ]; else [a(i,j)] = [wˆj ]− [wˆ′i].
(c) Set [d(i,j)] = [d(i,j)] + β · [a(i,j)].
2. For i = 1, . . . , mˆ do in parallel [li] = 1.
3. For i = 1, . . . , nˆ do in parallel [l′i] = 1.
4. For i = 1, . . . , nˆ do
(a) For j = 1, . . . , mˆ do in parallel if (¬[lj ]) then [d(i,j)] =∞.
(b) Execute ([di], [jmin])← Min([d(i,1)], . . . , [d(i,mˆ)]).
(c) [b] = LT([di], α).
(d) For j = 1, . . . , mˆ do in parallel if (EQ([jmin], j) ∧ [b]) then [lj ] = 0, [l′i] = 0, t˜i = tj .
5. For i = 1, . . . , nˆ do
(a) For j = 1, . . . , mˆ do in parallel if (¬[lj ]) then [d(i,j)] =∞.
(b) Execute ([di], [jmin])← Min([d(i,1)], . . . , [d(i,mˆ)]).
(c) For j = 1, . . . , mˆ do in parallel if (EQ([jmin], j) ∧ [l′i]) then [lj ] = 0, [l′i] = 0, t˜i = tj .
6. Return {([di], t˜i)}nˆi=1.
27
Given two sets of points and public parameter α, the ClosestPoints protocol first computes the
distances between each pair of points in parallel in step 1 (according to the formula in step 3 of
Algorithm 3). Next, we mark each ti and si as available (steps 2 and 3, respectively). Step 4
iterates through all si’s and determines the closest available point tj to si (the distance to the
unavailable points is set to infinity to ensure that they are not chosen). If the closest point is
within the bounding box, si is paired up with tj and both are marked as unavailable.
At the end of step 4, some points si’s will be paired up with one of the tj ’s, while others
will not be. To ensure that the algorithm produces enough pairs for their consecutive use in
HighCurvatureFR, we repeat the pairing process with the si’s that remain available at this point
and without enforcing the constraint that the points of the pair must lie in close proximity of each
other. This computation corresponds to step 5. That is, this step pairs each available si with the
closest available point among the tj ’s even if it is far away from si (and is likely to be an unrelated
point). This is to ensure that enough distances are returned for their use in the parent protocol.
In this step, distances of all unavailable points are set to infinity and each si which is still marked
as available is updated with the closest distance and the corresponding tj .
What remains is to discuss protocol OptimalMotion that corresponds to secure evaluation of
the computation in Algorithm 4 and is given next. The computation in OptimalMotion follows the
steps of Algorithm 4 and omit its detailed description here. We re-arrange some operations in this
protocol to reduce the number of expensive operations.
(R, v)← OptimalMotion({(ti = ([xi], [yi], [zi]), si = ([x′i], [y′i], [z′i]))}ni=1)
1. For i = 1, . . . , n do in parallel
(a) Compute [k′i] = [xi] · [x′i]+[yi] · [y′i]+[zi] · [z′i], [k′′i ] = Sqrt(([xi]2+[yi]2+[zi]2)([x′i]2+[y′i]2+[z′i]2)),
and [ki] = Div([k
′
i], [k
′′
i ]).
(b) Compute [p(i,1)] = Sqrt(
1
2 +
1
2 · [ki]), [p(i,2)] = Sqrt( 12 − 12 · [ki]).
(c) Compute [bi] = [yi] · [z′i]− [zi] · [y′i], [b′i] = [zi] · [x′i]− [xi] · [z′i], and [b′′i ] = [xi] · [y′i]− [yi] · [x′i].
(d) Compute [u′i] = Div(1,Sqrt([bi]
2+[b′i]
2+[b′′i ]
2)) and ui = ([u(i,1)], [u(i,2)], [u(i,3)]) = ([bi]·[u′i]), ([b′i]·
[u′i]), ([b
′′
i ] · [u′i]).
(e) Compute and set q′i = ([q
′
(i,1)], [q
′
(i,2)], [q
′
(i,3)], [q
′
(i,4)]) = ([p(i,1)], [p(i,2)]·[u(i,1)], [p(i,2)]·[u(i,2)], [p(i,2)]·
[u(i,3)]).
2. Set q = ([q1], [q2, [q3], [q4]) = q
′
1.
3. For i = 2, . . . , n compute [q′′1 ] = [q1] · [q′(i,1)]− [q2] · [q′(i,2)]− [q3] · [q′(i,3)]− [q4] · [q′(i,4)], [q′′2 ] = [q1] · [q′(i,2)]+
[q′(i,1)] · [q2] + [q3] · [q′(i,4)]− [q4] · [q′(i,3)], [q′′3 ] = [q1] · [q′(i,3)] + [q′(i,1)] · [q3] + [q2] · [q′(i,4)]− [q4] · [q′(i,2)], and
[q′′4 ] = [q1] · [q′(i,4)] + [q′(i,1)] · [q4] + [q2] · [q′(i,3)]− [q3] · [q′(i,2)], then set [q1] = [q′′1 ], [q2] = [q′′2 ], [q3] = [q′′3 ],
and [q4] = [q
′′
4 ].
4. Compute [qˆ(1,1)] = [q1]
2, [qˆ(2,2)] = [q2]
2, [qˆ(3,3)] = [q3]
2, [qˆ(4,4)] = [q4]
2, [qˆ(2,3)] = [q2] · [q3], [qˆ(1,4)] =
[q1] · [q4], [qˆ(2,4)] = [q2] · [q4], [qˆ(1,3)] = [q1] · [q3], [qˆ(3,4)] = [q3] · [q4], and [qˆ(1,2)] = [q1] · [q2].
5. Compute matrix R = {[rij ]}3i,j=1, where [r11] = [qˆ(1,1)] + [qˆ(2,2)]− [qˆ(3,3)]− [qˆ(4,4)], [r12] = 2 · ([qˆ(2,3)]−
[qˆ(1,4)]), [r13] = 2·([qˆ(2,4)]+[qˆ(1,3)]), [r21] = 2·([qˆ(2,3)]+[qˆ(1,4)]), [r22] = [qˆ(1,1)]−[qˆ(2,2)]+[qˆ(3,3)]−[qˆ(4,4)],
[r23] = 2 · ([qˆ(3,4)] − [qˆ(1,2)]), [r31] = 2 · ([qˆ(2,4)] − [qˆ(1,3)]), [r32] = 2 · ([qˆ(3,4)] − [qˆ(1,2)]), and [r33] =
[qˆ(1,1)]− [qˆ(2,2)]− [qˆ(3,3)] + [qˆ(4,4)];
6. Compute [t′′1 ] =
1
n · Σni=1[xi], [t′′2 ] = 1n · Σni=1[yi], [t′′3 ] = 1n · Σni=1[zi];
7. Compute [s′′1 ] =
1
n · Σni=1[x′i], [s′′2 ] = 1n · Σni=1[y′i], [s′′3 ] = 1n · Σni=1[z′i];
8. Compute vector v = {[vi]}3i=1, where [v1] = [t′′1 ] + [r11] · [s′′1 ] + [r12] · [s′′2 ] + [r13] · [s′′3 ], [v2] = [t′′2 ] + [r21] ·
[s′′1 ] + [r22] · [s′′2 ] + [r23] · [s′′3 ], [v3] = [t′′3 ] + [r31] · [s′′1 ] + [r32] · [s′′2 ] + [r33] · [s′′3 ].
9. Return (R, v).
Note that here many steps are independent of each other and can be carried out in parallel.
For examples steps 1(a)–(b) and 1(c)–(d) correspond to independent branches of computation.
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Furthermore, some (rather cheap) redundant operations are retained in the protocol for readability,
while an implementation would execute them only once. Additional small optimizations are also
possible. For example, a number of multiplications in step 1 correspond to multiplication of integer
and fixed-point operands, which can be implemented faster than regular fixed-point multiplication.
The complexity of HighCurvatureFR (using ClosestPoints and OptimalMotion as sub-protocols) is
O(` log `+mn`+ γ(nˆmˆ`2 + c(nˆ log nˆ log log nˆ+ `
√
nˆ log2 nˆ))) interactive operations in O(min(m,n)
log max(m,n)+γ(`+nˆ log mˆ+c log nˆ)) rounds using SS and it is O(mn`2+N`2+γ`nˆ(ξmˆ`+c log nˆ))
gates using GC.
6.3 Secure Fingerprint Recognition based on Spectral Representation
In this section, we present our third secure fingerprint recognition protocol based on spectral minutia
representation called SpectralFR. The construction builds on Algorithm 5 and incorporates both
types of feature reduction (CPCA and LDFT) not included in Algorithm 5. Recall that in the
second type of feature reduction, LDFT, (or when both types of feature reduction are applied)
rotation of fingerprint/matrix S is performed by multiplying each cell of S by value e−i
2pi
N
jα, where
j is the cell’s row and α is the amount of rotation. While it is possible to implement rotations by
providing 2λ+1 different copies of S rotated by different amounts as input into the protocol where λ
is the maximum amount of rotation, we perform any necessary rotation inside the protocol to avoid
the price of significantly increasing the input size. We were also able to maintain performing only
O(log λ) score computations instead of all 2λ+ 1 scores in our secure and oblivious protocol, which
is an important contribution of this work. In addition, because we can avoid increasing the input
size to have a linear dependency on λ, this allows us to achieve low asymptotic complexity and high
efficiency. Low asymptotic complexity is important because the size of fingerprint representation
is already large in this approach.
In what follows, we treat the case when λ = 15 (with the total of 31 rotations to be considered)
as in the original algorithm [56], but it is not difficult to generalize the computation to any λ.
We apply our generalization and optimization of Algorithm 5 described in section 3.3 with 4 ·
32 = 36 different rotations to cover at least 31 necessary alignments. Note that this approach
computes 8 similarity scores instead of 9 in the original algorithm. We number all 36 rotations
as α = −17, . . . , 18. The rotation constants e−i 2piN jα = cos(−2piN jα) + i sin(−2piN jα) are fixed and
can be precomputed for each j = 1, . . . , N ′ and α = −17, . . ., 18 by each party. We denote these
values by public matrix Z = {zα,j}18,N
′
α=−17,j=1 which each party stores locally. Each zα,j is a tuple
(z
(1)
α,j = cos(−2piN jα), z
(2)
α,j = sin(−2piN jα)), and Z is specified as part of the input in SpectralFR.
To be able to compute only O(log λ) scores in the protocol, we need to obliviously determine
the correct amount of rotation in steps 3 and 4 of Algorithm 5 without revealing any information
about k or k′. We securely realize this functionality by placing the values associated with each
possible k or k′ in an array and retrieving the right elements at a private index. In more detail, the
protocol first computes four scores that correspond to rotations by −13, −4, 3, and 12 positions
and computes the best among them (steps 3 and 4 below). Because the location of the best score
cannot be revealed, in the next step of the algorithm we put together an array consisting of four
vectors and one of them is privately selected using Lookup (steps 4–5 of the protocol). The selected
vector consists of 2N ′ values that allow us to compute two new scores and the maximum score for
the next iteration of algorithm. We repeat the process of private retrieval of the necessary rotation
coefficients, this time using an array consisting of twelve vectors. After computing two more scores
and determining the best score, the algorithm outputs the best score together with the amount of
rotation that resulted in that score.
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The protocol SpectralFR is given next. Because it corresponds to the computation with both
types of feature reduction, input matrices T and S are composed of complex values. Thus, we
represent each cell of T as a pair (ai,j , bi,j) with the real and imaginary parts, respectively, and
each cell of S as a pair (a′i,j , b
′
i,j). All computations proceed over fixed-point values.
([Cmax], [αmax]) ← SpectralFR(T = {[ti,j ] = ([ai,j ], [bi,j ])}M
′,N ′
i=1,j=1, S = {[si,j ] = ([a′i,j ], [b′i,j ])}M
′,N ′
i=1,j=1,
Z = {zi,j}18,N
′
i=−17,j=1, λ = 15)
1. Set [Cmax] = [0].
2. For i = 1, . . . ,M ′ and j = 1, . . . , N ′ do in parallel if (j 6= 1) then [xi,j ] = 2([ai,j ] · [a′i,j ] + [bi,j ] · [b′i,j ]),
[yi,j ] = 2([a
′
i,j ] · [bi,j ]− [ai,j ] · [b′i,j ]), else [xi,j ] = [ai,j ] · [a′i,j ], [yi,j ] = −[ai,j ] · [b′i,j ].
3. For k = 0, . . . , 3, do in parallel
(a) [C−13+9k] = 0.
(b) For i = 1, . . . ,M ′ and j = 1, . . . , N ′ do [C−13+9k] = [C−13+9k]+z
(1)
−13+9k,j · [xi,j ]+z(2)−13+9k,j · [yi,j ].
4. Compute the maximum as ([Cmax], [αmax])← Max([C−13], [C−4], [C5], [C14]).
5. For i = 0, . . . , 3 and j = 1, . . . , N ′ do in parallel z′i,j = z−16+9i,j and z
′
i,N ′+j = z−10+9i,j .
6. Let Z ′i = (z
′
i,1, . . ., z
′
i,2N ′) for i = 0, . . ., 3 and execute [Z
′
max] ← Lookup((Z ′0, . . ., Z ′3), [αmax]); let
[Z ′max] = ([zˆ1], . . ., [zˆ2N ′ ]).
7. For i = 1, . . . ,M ′ and j = 1, . . . , N ′ do [Cαmax−3] = [Cαmax−3]+[zˆ
(1)
j ] · [xi,j ]+[zˆ(2)j ] · [yi,j ], [Cαmax+3] =
[Cαmax+3] + [zˆ
(1)
N ′+j ] · [xi,j ] + [zˆ(2)N ′+j ] · [yi,j ].
8. Compute ([Cmax], [αmax])← Max([Cαmax−3], [Cmax], [Cαmax+3]).
9. For i = 0, . . . , 11 and j = 1, . . . , N ′ do in parallel z′i,j = z−17+3i,j and z
′
i,N ′+j = z−15+3i,j .
10. Let Z ′i = (z
′
i,1, . . ., z
′
i,2N ′) for i = 0, . . ., 11 and execute [Z
′
max] ← Lookup((Z ′0, . . ., Z ′11), [αmax]); let
[Z ′max] = ([zˆ1], . . ., [zˆ2N ′ ]).
11. For i = 1, . . . ,M ′ and j = 1, . . . , N ′ do [Cαmax−1] = [Cαmax−1]+[zˆ
(1)
j ] · [xi,j ]+[zˆ(2)j ] · [yi,j ], [Cαmax+1] =
[Cαmax+1] + [zˆ
(1)
N ′+j ] · [xi,j ] + [zˆ(2)N ′+j ] · [yi,j ].
12. Compute ([Cmax], [αmax])← Max([Cαmax−1], [Cmax], [Cαmax+1]).
13. Return [Cmax] and [αmax].
For efficiency reasons, we perform all multiplications associated with the score computation without
any rotation in the beginning of the protocol (step 1). This computation (i.e., multiplications of
the real and imaginary components of each ti,j and si,j) is common to all score computations (see
equation 1) and is reused later in the protocol. Then to compute a score between T and S rotated
by α positions, the coefficients from Z are multiplied to the computed products. In particular, the
computation takes form of {[z(1)α,j ] · [xi,j ]}M
′,N ′
i=1,j=1 and {[z(2)α,j ] · [yi,j ]}M
′,N ′
i=1,j=1 according to equation 1,
which are added together to get the score. The rest of the protocol proceeds as described above by
using private lookups twice. Note that the result of each lookup is an array as opposed to a single
element. Also note that the score computation uses public zi,j ’s in step 1(b), but the coefficients
become private in steps 7 and 11 because they depend of private data. Finally, the factor 1
MN2
present in equation 1 is not included in the computation because it is public. The computed score
can be scaled down by this factor by an output recipient if necessary.
Recall that SpectralFR uses fixed-point arithmetic, but performance of some operations can be
optimized. For example, with SS we can skip truncation after each multiplication in step 7 or 11
and instead truncate the sum after adding all products. In addition, we can restrict variables to
shorter bitlength representations when the range of values they store is known to be small. This
is relevant to multiplications in step 2 for GCs, where ti,j and si,j are known not to exceed N + 1
and can be represented using a short bitlength for the integer part.
The complexity of the SpectralFR protocol is O(N ′M ′k+`) interactive operations in O(1) rounds
using SS, and it is O(N ′M ′`2) gates using GC. Therefore, the computation is expected to be faster
using SS.
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Figure 2: Execution time of SpectralFR in seconds in the secret sharing multi-party setting.
M ′ N
′
66 70 74 78 82
28 0.250 0.268 0.269 0.279 0.285
30 0.266 0.276 0.276 0.287 0.295
32 0.283 0.283 0.307 0.308 0.309
Table 3: Execution time of protocol SpectralFR in seconds using secret sharing.
7 Performance Evaluation
In this section we evaluate performance of the spectral minutia representation fingerprint recog-
nition protocol SpectralFR to demonstrate that the proposed protocols are practical. We provide
experimental results for both two-party and multi-party settings. The implementations were writ-
ten in C/C++. In the two-party setting, our implementation uses the JustGarble library [11, 10] for
circuit garbling and GC evaluation which we modified to support the half-gates optimization [59].
In the multi-party settings, we use PICCO [60] with three computational parties, which utilized
linear threshold SS. The statistical security parameter κ is set in PICCO to 48 and communication
channels are protected using 128-bit AES.
In our implementation, we assume that the inputs T and S are represented with 32-bit precision
after the radix point. Our GC implementation maintains 56-bit fixed-point representation (24 and
32 bits before and after the radix point), while in the SS setting we let the numbers grow beyond
the 56 bits to avoid the cost of truncation, but perform truncation prior to returning the result.
All machines used in the experiments had identical hardware with four-core 3.2GHz Intel i5-3470
processors running Red Hat Linux 2.6.32 and were connected via a 1Gb LAN. Only one core was
used during the experiments. We ran each experiment 10 times and report the mean value.
The results of SpectralFR performance evaluation can be found in Table 3 and Figure 2 for
the three-party case and in Table 4 and Figure 3 for the two-party case. We report performance
for a range of parameters N ′ and M ′ that might be used in practice. All numbers correspond to
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Figure 3: Execution time of SpectralFR in seconds in the garbled circuits two-party setting.
M ′
N ′
66 70 74 78 82
Time Gates Time Gates Time Gates Time Gates Time Gates
28 60.0 454.2M 63.6 481.8M 67.3 509.4M 70.9 537.0M 74.5 564.5M
30 64.3 486.7M 68.1 516.2M 72.0 545.8M 75.9 575.3 79.8 604.8M
32 69.1 519.1M 72.7 550.6M 76.8 582.1M 81.0 613.6 85.1 645.1M
Table 4: Execution time of protocol SpectralFR in seconds and the total number of gates in millions
in its implementation using GCs.
the overall runtime including communication. In the SS setting, computation uses 73–79% of the
total time. Because in the GC setting the overall runtime is composed of multiple components,
we provide a breakdown of the total time according to its constituents. We have that garbling
uses 26–27% of the overall time, GC evaluation takes 15–16%, oblivious transfer takes about 1%
of the time, and communication time is about 57%. Table 4 also provides the total number of
gates, and the portion of non-XOR gates was about 27.6% in all circuits. The above numbers tell
us that communication takes most of the time (even with the half-gates optimization that reduces
communication). Because circuit garbling can be performed offline, the work associated with circuit
garbling (a quarter of the overall time) and GC transmission can be done in advance saving most
of the total time.
Figure 4 explores scalability of the computation and reports performance of SpectralFR when
multiple executions of it are carried out in parallel. It is clear that substantial performance im-
provement per comparison is achieved in this case.
As one can see, secure fingerprint recognition takes a fraction of a second in the multi-party
setting and tens of seconds in the two-party setting. This shows that the protocol is efficient for
practical use. The computation used in SpectralFR is a rare example of a functionality that can be
implemented significantly more efficiently using SS techniques than GC evaluation due to its heavy
use of multiplications.
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Figure 4: Execution time of SpectralFR in seconds using SS.
Because this is the first work that treats secure fingerprint alignment, its performance is not
directly comparable to other constructions from the literature that consider only the matching step.
The closest to this work are the fingerprint matching techniques from [18, 17] which have corre-
sponding implementations. [17] combines GCs with homomorphic encryption, while [18] provides a
data-oblivious algorithm that can be instantiated with SS or GC, but the implementation is based
on GCs. Performance reported in these publications is on the order of 1–3 seconds per compar-
ison and in [17] there are also one time costs that can be amortized across multiple fingerprint
comparisons.
Our SpectralFR is interesting because it uses only a small number of matching computations
(8), but the computation associated with each matching step is relatively high due to the value
to which parameters N ′ and M ′ need to be set. Its performance is well below 1 second in the SS
setting, but we cannot necessarily say that it outperforms other approaches (without alignment).
Based on the results of this work, we anticipate that the runtime of the algorithm in [18] can be
substantially improved if multi-party SS is employed instead of two-party GCs. This is because the
algorithm in [18] is multiplication-heavy, similar to our SpectralFR.
8 Conclusions
In this work, we design three secure and efficient protocols for fingerprint alignment and matching
for two-party and multi-party settings. They are based on popular algorithms in the computer
vision literature and employ new non-trivial techniques. The constructions are presented in the
semi-honest setting and known results can be applied to strengthen the security to sustain malicious
actors. We believe that this is the first work that treats the problem of secure fingerprint alignment.
Another main contribution of this work is designing secure constructions for fundamental nu-
meric and set operations. We present novel secure protocols for sine, cosine, arctangent, and square
root for fixed-point numbers, as well as a novel secure and data-oblivious protocol for selection of
the fth smallest element of a set (for any type of data). The techniques are applicable to both
two-party and multi-party settings. Our hope is that these techniques find their applicability well
beyond fingerprint recognition and that this work will facilitate secure processing of biometric data
in practice.
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A Alternative Design of Building Blocks
A.1 Trigonometric Functions
Recall that in section 5.2.1 we provide a method for securely evaluating trigonometric and inverse
trigonometric functions using polynomial evaluation. In this section we present an alternative
approach based on private lookup. When the input range is constrained (as in the fingerprint
recognition algorithms we are considering), this mechanism could result in improved performance,
but in general applications with arbitrary precision it is likely to run into scalability issues.
Consider a trigonometric function (such as sine or cosine used in this work) that needs to be
evaluated on private input a. Let the value of a be in the range [amin, amax] with N denoting the
number of the elements in the range. Then the approach consists of precomputing the function on
all possible inputs and storing the result in an array Z = (z0, . . ., zN−1). Consequently, evaluation
of the function on private a corresponds to privately retrieving the needed element of the array Z
using a to determine the index. This procedure is formalized in the protocol Trig below.
[b]← Trig([a], Z = {zi}N−1i=0 , amin)
1. Compute [b]← Lookup(〈z0, . . ., zN−1〉, [a]− amin).
2. Return [b].
Complexity of this protocol is heavily dominated by that of Lookup on an array of size N , and the
overall complexity is thus O(N logN). In our application, when we compute image rotation on a
small angle expressed as an integer in degrees, the value of N is small. For example, with rotations
by at most 10 degrees in each direction, we have N = 21 and thus this approach becomes very
efficient.
The situation, however, is different with inverse trigonometric functions. The input to such
functions is now a real number, which changes the way a lookup is to be implemented; but more
importantly, it is desirable to have the function support finer granularity than outputting integer
angles expressed in degrees. This will require the size of the array used for private lookup increase
substantially, mitigating the benefits of this approach. Thus, for inverse trigonometric functions
such as arctangent we recommend our main solution described in section 5.2.1.
A.2 Square Root
As an alternative approach to securely computing the square root of [a], we suggest to use ap-
proximations from [33, Chapter 6]. [33] uses polynomial approximations for square root based on
Heron’s and Newton’s iterations and has polynomial coefficients precomputed for different input
ranges and precision values.
To work correctly, this method requires that the range of input [a] is reduced to a specific range.
Range reduction of a follows the formula:
√
x = βv
√
aβ−2v = βv
√
β
√
aβ−(2v+1) (2)
Based on [33, Chapter 6], the constant β can be set to the base of the computer number system (such
as 2) and the range of the input will be reduced to 1β ≤ a′ ≤ 1, where a′ = aβ−2v or a′ = aβ−(2v+1) is
the normalized input. Alternatively, if a longer range can give acceptable accuracy, the constant β
can be set to a power of the computer number system base (e.g., 22, etc.) and the range will still be
reduced to 1β ≤ a′ ≤ 1. The trade-off here is that the larger the value of β is, the smaller precision
can be obtained using polynomials of the same degree. Thus, to achieve equivalent precision,
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polynomials of larger degrees will need to be used with larger β compared to lower values of β. We
suggest to set β = 2 and thus reduce the range of the input to 12 ≤ a′ ≤ 1, which provides high
precision for given polynomial degrees.
Next, note that if we let 12 ≤ a′ < 1, the normalized value a′ lies in the same range as the
normalized value in Section 5.2.2 and we can apply the normalization procedure Norm described in
that section. Furthermore, if we let β = 2 and adopt notation a′ = a · 2−w used in Section 5.2.2,
then based on equation 2, 2−w is either 2−2v or 2−(2v+1) depending on whether w is even or odd.
Recall that the Norm protocol outputs [a′] together with [2−b
w
2
c] and bit [c] which is set when w
is odd. This is very similar to what want here. That is, 2v = 2b
w
2
c and c is set when w is odd to
indicate that multiplication by
√
2 of the result is needed (as in equation 2). This means that we
can utilize a variant of the Norm protocol from Section 5.2.2 that outputs [2b
w
2
c] instead of [2−b
w
2
c]
but otherwise operates in the same way. To make this change to the Norm protocol of Section 5.2.2,
we only need to replace step 9 with [2b
w
2
c] ← (d`−1, . . ., [d0]) = (0 `−k2 −1, [u `
2
], [u `
2
−1], . . ., [u0], 0
k
2 )
and output [2b
w
2
c] in step 11. It is also not difficult to modify the normalization protocol in [47]
for the SS setting. In particular, we need to replace lines 8–10 of NormSQ in [47] by the following
computations:
8. Let [u0] = [z0], [u k
2
] = [zk−1] and for i = 1, . . ., k2 − 1 do in parallel [ui] = [z2i−1] + [z2i].
9. Compute [2b
w
2
c] =
∑k/2
i=0 2
i+f/2[ui].
10. Set [d] =
∑ k
2
−1
i=0 [z2i].
The protocol then returns 〈[c], [2bw2 c], [d]〉, which corresponds to 〈[a′], [2bw2 c], [c]〉 using our notation
from Norm. Note that here a fixed-point value is represented using the total of k bits, f of which
are stored after the radix point.
Once the input is normalized to the desired range, evaluation of the square root function amounts
to evaluating polynomials on the normalized input. Given the desired precision of the computation
in bits, we determine the minimum degrees of the polynomials and the coefficients corresponding
to the polynomials can be looked up from [33]. Similar to the polynomial evaluation approach
described for trigonometric functions in Section 5.2.1, there are two types of polynomial approxi-
mations: One type uses a regular polynomial P (x) of degree N and the other type uses a rational
function P (x)/Q(x), where P and Q are polynomials of degrees N and M , respectively. Based
on the cost of multiplication and division in the selected setting, either a regular polynomial or
rational function might be preferred. We recommend to use a rational function for GCs-based
implementations and regular polynomial for SS-based implementations. The overall square root
protocol Sqrt2 is given next.
[b]← Sqrt2([a])
1. Execute 〈[a′], [2bw2 c], [c]〉 ← Norm([a]).
2. Lookup the minimum polynomial degrees N and M using range [ 12 , 1) for which precision of the
approximation is at least k bits.
3. Lookup polynomial coefficients p0, . . ., pN and q0, . . ., qM for square root approximation.
4. Compute ([z1], . . . , [zmax(N,M)])← PreMul([a′],max(N,M)).
5. Compute [yP ] = p0 +
∑N
i=1 pi[zi].
6. Compute [yQ] = q0 +
∑M
i=1 qi[zi].
7. Compute [y]← Div([yP ], [yQ]).
8. Compute and return [b] = [y] · [2bw2 c] · (([c] ∧√2)⊕ ¬[c]).
In step 8 of this protocol we use (cheap) XOR in the GC setting, while in the SS setting, that
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operation is replaced with addition. As before, this protocol is written using a rational function
for approximation. When a single polynomial is used instead, the protocol evaluates only a single
polynomial P of (a different) degree N and the division operation is skipped in step 7.
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